India
Law Over Borders Comparative Guide: Family Asset Protection Law Guide: Divorce, Finance and the Media
Family Asset Protection Law Guide: Divorce, Finance and the Media
Chapters in this guide
12
In India, matrimonial financial disputes, particularly maintenance and child support, are increasingly intersecting with issues of asset protection and offshore holdings. Traditionally, personal laws and statutory frameworks, such as the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, Special Marriage Act, 1954, Indian Divorce Act, 1869, Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, and analogous statutes of various other personal laws for divorce and maintenance, deal with summary procedure for awarding maintenance based on the “lifestyle rule”, which has a very high margin of discretion.
There are no separate provisions governing the treatment of trusts or elaborate corporate vehicles in matrimonial litigation, but these vehicles can be considered as sources that fund a lifestyle when computing maintenance awards.
The main issue is financial disclosures in a maintenance proceeding that the parties are bound to give in the form of an Affidavit of Disclosure of Assets and Liabilities as prescribed by the courts in an evolving jurisprudence around the Kusum Sharma v. Mahinder Kumar Sharma cases (Kusum Sharma v. Mahinder Kumar Sharma (I) 2014 SCC OnLine Del 7627, Kusum Sharma v. Mahinder Kumar Sharma (II) 2015 SCC Online Del 6793, Kusum Sharma v. Mahinder Kumar Sharma (III) 2017 SCC OnLine Del 11796, Kusum Sharma v. Mahinder Kumar Sharma (IV) 2017 SCC OnLine Del 12534 and Kusum Sharma v. Mahinder Kumar Sharma (V) 2020 SCC OnLine Del 931). However, the process frequently encounters problems as a result of concealment. The courts have noted the disparity that can arise between disclosures and an apparent lifestyle that is often beyond the means that were disclosed in the affidavit (Kiran Tomar v. State of Uttar Pradesh 2022 SCC Online SC 1539, Aditi Alias Mithi v. Jitesh Sharma 2023 INSC 981).
The courts have described this summary assessment based on lifestyle as a “guesstimate” (Bharat Hegde v. Saroj Hegde 2007 SCC OnLine Del 622).
A framework for fuller and more precise financial disclosures was created by the Supreme Court in Rajnesh v. Neha 2021 2 SCC 324. Enclosure B of this framework mandates the litigating parties to provide comprehensive details of income, assets, liabilities and expenditures, extending to interests in any companies, partnerships or trusts, both in India and overseas.
The courts may, when computing sources funding a lifestyle, have the discretionary power to pierce the separate legal personality of a trust or holding entity, if they find that it is being used as a façade designed to defeat maintenance or child support obligations.
This approach is consistent with the equitable jurisdiction of family courts, empowered by statute (Family Courts Act, 1984) to secure financial justice between parties in a matrimonial litigation.
Consequently, individuals who are settlors, trustees or beneficiaries of trust arrangements should be aware that such interests can be scrutinised and potentially treated as constructive ownership when determining maintenance and child support obligations.
This represents a dynamic jurisprudence that is evolving towards greater precision in financial awards.
The Indian legal system recognises both private and public trusts. Private trusts are governed by the Indian Trusts Act, 1882, which defines the creation, administration and termination of trusts and establishes the fiduciary duties of trustees towards the beneficiaries and the rights of beneficiaries to the fullest advantage of the purpose of the trust.
Public trusts are regulated by state-specific laws and have no bearing on family law.
The Indian Trusts Act, 1882 can be applied to specific family trusts where the interest of the beneficiaries are to be protected and there is a high threshold of protection of interest of minors.
However, the principle of implied trust has also been brought in to ensure the dominant earner’s fiduciary duty to the family. For example, the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 implicitly incorporates the principle of implied trust by recognising a woman’s right to reside in the shared household and protecting her from economic abuse under section 3. This reflects a statutory acknowledgment of the fiduciary obligation of the dominant earner within the domestic relationship to ensure fair access to family resources.
In T.C. Chacko v. Annamma 1993 SCC OnLine Ker 13, the Kerala High Court held that assets transferred to defeat maintenance claims could be treated as held in a constructive trust for the benefit of the dependent spouse. Similarly, in Anjali Sawhney v. Anjali Trust 2001 SCC OnLine Del 765, the Delhi High Court refused to treat the trust corpus as beyond the settlor’s reach, given the continuing control and the self-serving nature of the trust.
Courts may also rely on section 4 of the Indian Trusts Act to invalidate trusts created for unlawful purposes, which would include defeating legal rights such as maintenance.
If a trust was created in contemplation of divorce or separation, especially where the settlor retains influence, discretionary powers or de facto control, it is likely to invite judicial scrutiny. However, where a trust is established in good faith for legitimate purposes (such as family succession planning) long before any matrimonial discord, and where the settlor does not retain control or beneficial enjoyment, courts are less likely to disregard the trust structure.
Nonetheless, even in such cases, disclosure of the trust interest is mandatory under the Rajnesh v. Neha framework, and courts will consider any indirect financial benefit or entitlement when determining maintenance and child support obligations.
If a trust is governed by Indian law and a foreign court passes a decree affecting the trust or its assets, Indian courts will first evaluate whether the decree is compliant with sections 13 and 44A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC), which is a prerequisite to its enforceability in India.
Under section 13, a foreign judgment is conclusive as to any matter directly adjudicated between the same parties, except in specific circumstances, such as:
- lack of jurisdiction by the foreign court;
- failure to observe principles of natural justice;
- the judgment having been obtained by fraud;
- the judgment sustaining a claim founded on a breach of Indian law; or
- the judgment being contrary to Indian public policy.
Section 44A allows for execution of a foreign decree from a reciprocating territory as if it were a decree of an Indian court, but the judgment debtor can still resist enforcement on the grounds above.
When it comes to trusts, courts in India are particularly cautious about enforcing foreign orders that would override fiduciary duties under the Indian Trusts Act, 1882, or conflict with local laws governing property and succession.
For example, a foreign order attempting to set aside an Indian trust purely on equitable principles may not automatically be enforced if it is inconsistent with Indian statutory provisions or public policy considerations.
“Public policy” in this context can be broad and may include the protection of beneficiaries’ rights under Indian trust law, the prohibition on defeating statutory maintenance rights under Indian personal laws, and the preservation of Indian rules on property succession and transfer.
Accordingly, while foreign decrees can be recognised and enforced, their impact on Indian trusts will be carefully scrutinised. Indian courts will balance the principles of comity of nations and respect for foreign judgments with the need to uphold domestic trust law, statutory maintenance entitlements, and public policy considerations.
In Rajnesh v. Neha, the Supreme Court introduced a comprehensive and mandatory financial disclosure regime, applicable in all maintenance proceedings. Enclosure B of the judgment requires disclosure of (including but not limited to):
- income from all sources;
- movable and immovable property;
- investments and shareholdings;
- bank statements; and
- income tax returns.
While the judgment does not specifically use the word “trust”, its scope extends to any asset or income stream, whether held directly or through nominees, entities or fiduciaries. This includes discretionary trusts, irrevocable trusts, and offshore structures, especially where the spouse is a beneficiary or settlor.
Under Indian law, trustees are not automatically obligated to make financial disclosures in divorce proceedings unless they are made parties to the case since disclosure obligations lie primarily with the litigating spouses. However, a litigating spouse must disclose his or her beneficial interest in a trust.
A trust may be impleaded in financial proceedings to compel production of relevant documents or disclosure of trust accounts and transactions. The conundrum is that often separate proceedings are required for this instead of an omnibus matrimonial proceeding because the Family Courts Act has not provided explicitly for proceedings against companies and trusts within its jurisdiction. Section 7 of the Family Courts Act reads as below:
(1) Subject to the other provisions of this Act, a Family Court shall:
(a) have and exercise all the jurisdiction exercisable by any district court or any subordinate civil court under any law for the time being in force in respect of suits and proceedings of the nature referred to in the Explanation; and
(b) be deemed, for the purposes of exercising such jurisdiction under such law, to be a district court or, as the case may be, such subordinate civil court for the area to which the jurisdiction of the Family Court extends.
Explanation. The suits and proceedings referred to in this sub-section are suits and proceedings of the following nature, namely:
(a) a suit or proceeding between the parties to a marriage for a decree of nullity of marriage (declaring the marriage to be null and void or, as the case may be, annulling the marriage) or restitution of conjugal rights or judicial separation or dissolution of marriage;
(b) a suit or proceeding for a declaration as to the validity of a marriage or as to the matrimonial status of any person;
(c) a suit or proceeding between the parties to a marriage with respect to the property of the parties or of either of them;
(d) a suit or proceeding for an order or injunction in circumstance arising out of a marital relationship;
(e) a suit or proceeding for a declaration as to the legitimacy of any person;
(f) a suit or proceeding for maintenance;
(g) a suit or proceeding in relation to the guardianship of the person or the custody of, or access to, any minor.
(2) Subject to the other provisions of this Act, a Family Court shall also have and exercise:
(a) the jurisdiction exercisable by a Magistrate of the first class under Chapter IX (relating to order for maintenance of wife, children and parents) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974); and
(b) such other jurisdiction as may be conferred on it by any other enactment.
Indian courts do not have direct jurisdiction over offshore trustees as such entities are governed by the law of the jurisdiction in which the trust is constituted. Consequently, Indian courts cannot ordinarily compel a foreign trustee to appear or produce documents.
However, a spouse who is a beneficiary or has any direct or indirect interest in an offshore trust is obligated to disclose such interests under the mandatory disclosure framework laid down by the Supreme Court in Rajnesh v. Neha. This includes:
- the nature and value of the beneficial interest;
- any discretionary entitlements or distributions received; and
- the identity of the trust and trustees.
Where a party fails to comply with these disclosure obligations, Indian courts are empowered to draw an adverse inference, presuming the existence of undisclosed assets or higher income capacity, and to impute income or financial capacity based on lifestyle evidence and other indirect indicators.
If a trust governed by Indian law is implicated in divorce proceedings filed in a foreign jurisdiction, Indian trustees are not automatically obligated under Indian law to comply with disclosure orders issued by the foreign court, until the decree is tested by the Indian courts, in accordance with the procedure provided above.
However, the trustee can of course choose to submit to the foreign jurisdiction, in which case the Indian court would uphold that voluntary submission under the principle of comity of courts.
To enforce such an order from a foreign court in India, the party seeking disclosure must approach an Indian court for recognition and enforcement under sections 13 and 44A of the CPC, which requires establishing that the foreign court had proper jurisdiction, that the proceedings observed principles of natural justice, and that the order is not contrary to Indian public policy or Indian trust law.
Alternatively, the foreign court may issue a request for judicial assistance, in which case the Indian court has discretion to compel or decline disclosure after considering whether the request aligns with Indian legal principles and fiduciary obligations.
If a spouse is a beneficiary of a trust, and the court finds they have the ability to draw distributions from it, they may be directed to satisfy support obligations using such funds. In T.C. Chacko v. Annamma, the court disregarded formal titles to recognise beneficial control over assets.
Enforcement of such orders is typically carried out under Order 21 of the CPC, which permits attachment of periodic trust distributions, garnishee orders, or seizure of other assets. In cases of wilful non-compliance, the court may also resort to civil imprisonment under section 51 of the CPC to compel payment.
The position concerning enforcement of foreign court orders remains the same regardless of the spouse beneficiary’s paying capacity from individual funds or those from the trust. Where a foreign court has determined or assumed that the spouse beneficiary will be able to obtain distributions from a trust or even if it holds that the spouse beneficiary has no separate assets and can only pay the award by obtaining distributions from a trust governed by Indian law to satisfy a divorce award, the foreign judgment does not automatically bind the trustee or compel payments from the trust under Indian law.
To be enforceable in India, the judgment must first be recognised by an Indian court under sections 13 and 44A of the CPC, which requires demonstration that the foreign court had proper jurisdiction, that principles of natural justice were observed, and that the decision is not contrary to Indian public policy or Indian trust law.
If the foreign decree meets these requirements and is recognised in India, the order will be made executable. If the spouse beneficiary is unable or unwilling to make payment, the Indian court may enforce the award through attachment of any distributions as they arise, or other measures available under Order 21 of the CPC.
As maintenance orders are in personam they are not directly enforceable against third parties, such as trustees. However, Indian courts may summon or implead trustees in matrimonial proceedings where trust assets are relevant to assessing the financial capacity of a party.
Such impleadment is not automatic, and may be subject to challenge, particularly where the trust’s validity or purpose is itself disputed.
A trustee may resist impleadment by asserting the independence of the trust and the lack of legal connection to the matrimonial dispute.
Conversely, the spouse seeking disclosure or enforcement may allege that the trust is a sham, a nominee arrangement, or was created to defeat spousal or child support obligations, in which case the court will undertake a fact-specific inquiry.
If the trustee is found to be obstructing the court process or complicit in concealing assets, the court may invoke sections 73 and 74 of the Indian Trusts Act, 1882 to remove or substitute the trustee for acting contrary to the purpose of the trust or for using the trust to defeat legitimate rights.
This power is used with caution, however, and is a long process until the court can make such a finding.
Where the spouse is a direct or even indirect beneficiary, and has previously received or is likely to receive distributions, the court may:
- impute income from the trust;
- order the spouse to apply for a distribution and report compliance; and
- treat refusal to access such income as deliberate evasion, potentially inviting adverse inference.
Indian courts, including the Supreme Court, have consistently emphasised the principle of substance over form. In State of Rajasthan v. Gotan Lime Stone 2016 SCC OnLine SC 63, the court pierced the corporate veil to expose sham transactions.
These principles have also informed matrimonial jurisprudence, where courts have looked beyond formal ownership to recognise implied trusts and fiduciary obligation. Similarly to the judgment of T.C. Chacko v. Annamma, as referred to above, in Pratibha Rani v. Suraj Kumar 1985 SCC OnLine SC 90, the court held that stridhan (a woman’s wealth — for example, jewellery gifted to her at the time of marriage) entrusted by the wife to her husband or his family is held in trust by them and that they are bound to return this when she asks. This is an instance of the courts’ willingness to apply the principle of implied trust.
Indian courts cannot directly attach or enforce orders against trust assets situated abroad, but where the beneficiary resides in India and has submitted to the Indian jurisdiction, the court can:
- direct a party to obtain a mirror order from the appropriate court of foreign jurisdiction;
- draw adverse inferences from any failure to do so;
- initiate enforcement through civil imprisonment under section 51 of the CPC in case of wilful non-payment of maintenance.
In appropriate cases, courts may also invoke Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties (MLATs) or bilateral/ reciprocating treaties to execute their orders.
Trustees of trusts governed by Indian law do not have an automatic obligation to comply with orders passed by a foreign court. Under Indian jurisprudence, a foreign divorce or financial order can only be enforced against an Indian trustee if:
- the foreign decree is recognised by an Indian court under section 13, read with section 44A of the CPC;
- the trustee is impleaded as a party in Indian proceedings; and
- the Indian court finds that such enforcement does not violate public policy, natural justice, or the law of trusts.
Indian trustees may resist direct enforcement on grounds of lack of personal jurisdiction or the independence of trust administration. However, where the trust is found to be an alter ego or nominee vehicle for a party to the matrimonial proceedings, the Indian court may compel compliance and find the trust to be illegal or void, or it could order a different management or supervision of its working under sections 73 and 74 of the Indian Trusts Act, 1882.
Where a spouse is a beneficiary of a trust governed by Indian law, Indian courts can enforce a foreign divorce decree, once recognised, by directing the spouse to fulfil maintenance obligations from trust distributions, provided the spouse:
- has received distributions in the past;
- retains a fixed or discretionary beneficial interest; and
- exercises de facto control over the trust’s management or corpus.
Since maintenance orders are in personam, enforcement is focused on compelling the spouse to act, such as by applying for a distribution from the trust, rather than directly binding the trust entity itself. Courts may draw an adverse inference if the spouse refuses to make reasonable efforts to access trust assets and may penalise the defaulting or non-cooperating party.
Indian courts are competent to enforce orders against trust assets situated within India, subject to the findings mentioned above. However, enforcement against trust assets located outside India is generally not feasible unless:
- a foreign court with jurisdiction over the offshore situs enforces the Indian judgment; or
- the Indian beneficiary voluntarily accesses and applies those funds toward the support obligation.
In the Indian jurisdiction, courts retain broad powers to enforce compliance of their orders by attachment of assets under Order 21 of the CPC and also as a wilful breach of the court’s orders constituting contempt of court. These powers can be exercised against the party and a trustee can be charged with contempt of court.
In India, marital rights and obligations are determined by distinct personal laws, and thus different processes for divorce and maintenance. Custody decisions are all decided around the central principle of the best interest of the child.
Within this legal mosaic, there is no common provision for PNAs.
In Islamic law, since marriage is contractual, the nikah nama or the marriage contract can be read as a PNA.
Section 40 of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869, which applies to Christians, empowers a court to make an enquiry and to rule on the existence of antenuptial agreements and PNAs. The agreements would not apply unless they meet the criteria of being fair and just and with fair and equal bargaining power.
Articles 1603–1605 of the Portuguese Civil Code, 1867, applicable in Goa, expressly recognise marital property agreements, and PNAs are routinely recorded before marriage.
The Special Marriage Act and the Hindu Marriage Act have no specific provision for such agreements, although in Ravi Singhal & Ors v. Manali Singhal 2000 SCC OnLine Del 546 the Delhi High Court observed that such contracts can be considered by the court even if the statute does not explicitly so provide.
Nevertheless, other High Courts have differed. For instance, in Tekait Mon Mohini Jemadai v. Basanta Kumar Singh 1901 SCC OnLine Cal 60, the Calcutta High Court invalidated an antenuptial condition restraining a husband’s freedom to relocate his wife, holding it to be against public policy. Similarly, in Krishna Aiyar v. Balammal 1911 ILR 34 MAD 398, an agreement anticipating future separation was struck down as contrary to Hindu personal law. The Allahabad High Court in CIT v. Shanti Meattle 1971 SCC OnLine All 452 refused to uphold a clause that effectively terminated all marital obligations, reaffirming that such arrangements are incompatible with the core tenets of marriage. That said, a more flexible reading has begun to surface.
In Commissioner of Income Tax v. Mansukhrai More 1988 SCC OnLine Cal 339 the Calcutta High Court upheld the enforceability of a prenuptial agreement requiring the husband to transfer property into a trust exclusively for the benefit of future children born within the marriage. The court ruled that such a transfer did not violate section 16(3) of the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922, thereby affirming that agreements aimed at protecting the interests of potential offspring or promoting family welfare do not offend public policy.
Similarly, in Mohd. Khan v. Shahmali 1971 SCC Online J&K 32, the Jammu & Kashmir High Court recognised the validity of a prenuptial understanding within the culturally specific practice of khana damad, where a husband resides with his in-laws. The court concluded that the financial obligations outlined in the agreement were rooted in custom, undertaken voluntarily, and consistent with public policy, thus respecting the parties’ autonomy in structuring their marital arrangement
In Sunita Devendra Deshprabhu v. Sita Devendra Deshprabhu, 2016 SCC OnLine Bom 9296, the Bombay High Court (at Goa) examined the relevance of a 1951 PNA executed between Sita Devi and her husband that was used by the husband and his family to resist the wife’s claim in his family property. The court held that, while the agreement was not automatically enforceable as a contract, it could not be disregarded outright. It recognised the PNA as a relevant piece of evidence that reflected the mutual intention of the parties at the time of marriage and that had a bearing on how property arrangements were understood within the family.
What has thus emerged is that courts will not apply such agreements rigidly if challenged and they retain full discretion to disregard or modify the agreement.
This approach is reflected in section 25 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956, which allows a court to consider “any agreement or custom” in determining maintenance, but does not mandate its enforcement as binding in all circumstances. Instead, the court weighs such agreements against factors such as the financial position of the parties, legal entitlements under personal law, and the overall fairness of the arrangement.
Moreover, Indian family law statutes, including section 25(2) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 and section 127 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, recognise the possibility of a change in circumstances and explicitly provide for modification or rescission of prior maintenance orders or agreements. Courts routinely invoke these provisions to re-evaluate financial arrangements in light of evolving facts, such as change in income, remarriage, or increased needs of the dependent spouse or child.
In practice, this means that, even when a financial agreement between spouses exists, courts will juxtapose its terms against applicable personal law and the facts of the case to ensure that the outcome is just, equitable, and reasonable. Such agreements are used as a guide for the court as to original intention and eventual outcome of fairness and justice but cannot oust the jurisdiction of the court to rule on statutory rights.
If the foreign court has passed a decree on the PNA, it will be subject to the test encapsulated under sections 13 and 14 of the CPC.
Courts have rejected foreign legal arrangements, including settlements and custody orders, if they violate Indian principles of fairness or contravene statutory protections under laws such as the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890, and the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005.
Although Indian courts may, in some cases, undertake a “choice of law” analysis, especially where one party resides abroad or where proceedings are underway in multiple jurisdictions, the ultimate outcome is grounded in Indian standards of equity and justice. This was held in the case of Y. Narasimha Rao v. Y. Venkata Lakshmi 1991 SCC OnLine SC 191.
There is currently no central legislation in India that mandates the creation, recognition or enforcement of PNAs. As such, there are no statutory procedural requirements akin to those found in other jurisdictions but, as mentioned above, they can be looked at subject to certain general principles of fairness and equal bargaining power.
These can also be modified or disregarded entirely if the provisions are found to be against law or against the welfare of children. For example, in G. Ganesan v. R. Vijayarani 2019 7 SCC 108, the Supreme Court found that a consent decree with regard to maintenance of children did not take away a statutory right of the child to the parents’ property apart from the amounts agreed to.
Therefore, while a PNA can serve as a useful record of mutual intention and may influence judicial discretion, it does not replace the court’s authority to do justice under Indian family law.
The jurisprudence of PNAs and trusts and the piercing of corporate veils, as mentioned in Section 1.1 and Section 2, above, is open to wide margins of discretion used in each case upon its unique facts.
PNAs cannot deal with financial claims regarding children. Even if a PNA contains provisions allocating expenses or responsibilities regarding children (such as education, healthcare or maintenance), such clauses are merely indicative and not enforceable per se. Indian courts retain overriding discretion to modify or disregard any such arrangements if they do not serve the best interests or are against the best interests of the child (G. Ganesan v. R. Vijayarani 2019 7 SCC 108).
Indian family law proceedings are designed to be private and confidential. Order XXXIIA Rule 2 of the CPC and section 11 of the Family Courts Act, 1984 provides for in camera hearings for family/matrimonial matters, making them mandatory if requested by either party.
This can, subject to a specific request, include masking of names in the petition, in the cause list and in virtual hearing protocols.
The only statutory exception to this regime of confidentiality arises by section 22 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 and section 33 of the Special Marriage Act, 1954, which permit publication of the judgment of a family court with permission of the court.
The confidentiality approach aligns with the constitutional guarantee of the right to privacy under K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India 2017 SCC OnLine SC 1462 where the Supreme Court held that personal dignity, autonomy, and informational privacy must be respected by the state. Public disclosure of identities in intimate family disputes, especially where children or vulnerable individuals are involved, would directly infringe this right. In X v. Z, 2015 SCC OnLine Del 10045, the Delhi High Court emphasised that children’s personal diaries and intimate disclosures are sensitive and should be filed only under seal, underscoring the court’s duty to uphold a child’s right to privacy and dignity.
In some states, family courts are empowered, as in the Delhi Family Courts (Amendment) Rules, 2024, to regulate or restrict virtual access and may take suo motu action or entertain claims by affected parties in cases of unauthorised dissemination.
Court documents in India are confidential, and access is restricted to parties and their authorised legal representatives. In X v. Z 2015 SCC OnLine Del 4652, the Delhi High Court directed that sensitive documents in a matrimonial dispute be kept confidential and sealed. The court acknowledged the potential harm of even indirect identification and underscored the importance of judicial sensitivity in such matters. Thereafter, Chapters VI and VII, Rule 17 of the Delhi Family Court Rules, 1996 (as amended in 2024) formally incorporated this guideline directing filing of sensitive documents in sealed cover, and further rules were incorporated to protect the privacy of parties. These include restrictions against extraction from any document without the leave of the court and regulation of access to such documents by any third parties. Rule 17 (ii) further empowers the court to suo moto pass appropriate orders concerning such documents to prevent their dissemination.
Cameras or recording devices are not permitted during family law proceedings, either physically or virtually. The Model Rules for Live Streaming and Recording of Court Proceedings (2021) introduced a framework for transparency in judicial functioning that expressly exclude in camera proceedings, including family law matters, from being live streamed or recorded.
In light of the challenges posed by virtual hearings, several protective measures have been adopted. Circulars issued by various High Courts reiterate that any unauthorised recording, live streaming, or dissemination of proceedings is strictly prohibited and may attract penal consequences under the Indian Copyright Act, 1957, the Information Technology Act, 2000, and the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, among other applicable laws.
The parties can apply to the court for various protective measures, including masking of names, anonymisation of orders, sealing of documents, or complete suppression of publication. Section 11 of the Family Courts Act, 1984 mandates that proceedings be held in camera. These safeguards are particularly relevant in cases involving children, domestic abuse, sexual misconduct, or reputational harm as right to privacy has been affirmed as a facet of Article 21 of the Constitution. In several cases including Sri Vasunathan v. The Registrar General, 2017 SCC OnLine Kar 424, the courts have acknowledged “the right to be forgotten“ in sensitive cases involving women in general and highly sensitive cases involving rape or affecting the modesty and reputation of the person concerned. While the media may report on matters of legal or public significance, such as judgments involving constitutional interpretation or systemic reform, they cannot access or report pleadings, affidavits, evidence, or confidential submissions in individual cases without the court’s permission.