Ireland

Competition Acts 2002 – 2022 (the “Competition Act”).

Mandatory. Under the Competition Act, filing is mandatory for:

• transactions that meet the jurisdictional thresholds under the Irish merger control regime and / or the Irish media merger regime; or
• transactions that the Competition and Consumer Protection Commission (CCPC) has required to be notified (i.e. “called in”) and have therefore become mandatorily notifiable.

The Competition Act also provides for voluntary notification of a transaction.

The CCPC is an independent statutory body that is responsible for investigating mergers and is the decision-maker for merger control reviews. The Irish courts have jurisdiction to adjudicate on any appeal against a merger decision or any allegation of breaches of the Competition Act more generally.

The Irish merger control regime applies to any relevant “merger or acquisition”; that is, any transaction involving a change of control (see Question 2.1, below).

There is an additional provision for “media mergers”:

• The Irish media merger regime applies where two or more undertakings carry on a media business in the State, or where one or more of the undertakings involved carry on a media business in the State and one or more undertakings carry on a media business elsewhere.
• A transaction that qualifies as a “media merger” is mandatorily notifiable to the CCPC irrespective of whether the turnover of the undertakings involved meets the jurisdictional thresholds under the general Irish merger control regime (unless it is notifiable to the European Commission (EC) under the EU Merger Regulation (EUMR)).
• Undertakings involved are required to make two notifications of a media merger.
  • One notification is sent to the CCPC, which determines whether the merger is likely to give rise to a substantial lessening of competition in the State (unless it is notifiable to the EC under the EUMR).
  • After clearance has been obtained from the CCPC (or the EC), a separate notification is subsequently sent to the Minister for Culture, Communications and Sport (as it currently is), who determines whether the result of the media merger will be contrary to the public interest in protecting the plurality of the media in the State. This includes a review of diversity of ownership and diversity of content.

There is also an FDI screening regime in Ireland.

Yes, the EUMR. Given the EC’s exclusive jurisdiction under the EUMR, where a transaction is notifiable under the EUMR, it is not notifiable in Ireland. Conversely, where a transaction is not notifiable under the EUMR, it may be notifiable in Ireland (as in other Member States) if the jurisdictional thresholds in Ireland are met.

Yes. Section 23 of the Competition and Consumer Protection 2014 Act permits the CCPC to enter into arrangements with competition authorities in other countries for the exchange of information and the mutual provision of assistance.

The CCPC maintains regular contact with competition authorities in other jurisdictions, in particular the EC and other Member State authorities through the European Competition Network and the UK’s Competition and Markets Authority (CMA), which may arise in the context of parallel merger reviews or where, in the context of EC process, the transaction has a specific impact on the Irish market.

The CCPC sits independently from the Minister for Culture, Communications and Sport in the context of the second-stage media plurality review in media mergers and the Minister for Enterprise, Tourism and Employment in the context of FDI screening reviews, and there is no practice of cooperation, coordination or alignment between the CCPC and those other authorities in the context of those reviews.

The scope of transactions caught by the Irish media merger regime and certain aspects of the procedure under the media merger regime are due to change on implementation into Irish law of Article 22 of the European Media Freedom Act (Regulation (EU) 2024/1083), which is due to occur in Q3 of 2026.

In addition, the Department of Enterprise, Tourism and Employment recently raised the financial thresholds at which mergers and acquisitions must be notified to the CCPC (as set out below). This follows the recommendation by the CCPC to the Department of Enterprise, Tourism and Employment in 2025 that the financial thresholds for mandatory notification be increased.

Yes — the trigger for merger control is a “change of control”. The concept of “control” is defined as the ability to exercise “decisive influence” over the activities of an undertaking and interpreted in the same manner as under the EUMR, as supplemented by the EC’s Consolidated Jurisdictional Notice (CJN) — that is, it gives the acquiring undertaking the ability to affect the strategic commercial direction of the acquired undertaking or assets that constitute a business.

The Irish merger control regime does not regulate the acquisition of interests other than those that confer “control”. Accordingly, the acquisition of a minority shareholding can only give rise to a mandatory notification requirement in a situation where that minority interest confers sole or joint control as defined above.

As explained above, the concept of “control” is interpreted in the same manner as under the EUMR, which generally means that control must be acquired on a lasting basis (even though the Competition Act does not explicitly stipulate this as a condition).

Amendments to the Competition Act have significantly limited the previously available “warehousing exception”, by which certain temporary acquisitions of control were not notifiable. The current position under the Competition Act is that this exception does not apply to transactions involving the future onward sale of the business to an ultimate buyer in circumstances where the ultimate buyer bears the major part of any economic risk.

The Irish merger control regime applies to any “merger or acquisition”, which is defined in the Competition Act as including transactions where:

• two or more undertakings, previously independent of one another, merge;
• one or more individuals who already control one or more undertakings, or one or more undertakings, acquire direct or indirect control of the whole or part of one or more other undertakings; or
• the acquisition of part of an undertaking involves the acquisition of assets that constitute a business to which a turnover can be attributed (with “assets” including goodwill).

The Irish merger control regime does not regulate the acquisition of interests other than those that confer “control” (see Question 2.1, above).

While the Competition Act does not define the concept of a “business”, the CCPC generally follows the principles set out in the CJN in this regard. Accordingly, the acquisition of assets — including newer types of structures — will generally be assessed by reference to whether it constitutes a business to which a turnover can be attributed, in accordance with CJN principles.

“Full-function” joint ventures (i.e. those that perform, on a lasting basis, all the functions of an autonomous economic entity) constitute a “merger or acquisition” for the purposes of the Irish merger control regime and the Irish media merger regime.

The CCPC adopts an approach that is generally consistent with the EUMR, as supplemented by the CJN, in identifying whether joint ventures are “full-function” and therefore come within the scope of the Irish merger control regime.

Where a joint venture does not qualify as full-function, the CCPC may assess it under section 4 of the Competition Act, which is based on Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.

While the CCPC has not published its own guidance on how interrelated transactions should be treated, it generally follows the principles set out in the CJN.

This is consistent with the CCPC’s decisional practice in which it has applied and made specific reference to the approach set out in the CJN, that interconditional transactions, for the purposes of merger review, can be considered as one single transaction if they are linked de jure and de facto and control is acquired ultimately by the same undertakings.

Irish merger control regime

The Irish merger control regime is mandatory where, for the most recent financial year:

• the aggregate turnover in the State of the undertakings involved is not less than EUR 100 million; and
• the turnover in the State of each of two or more of the undertakings involved is not less than EUR 15 million.

References to “the State” are references to the Republic of Ireland, excluding Northern Ireland.

The above thresholds are applicable to transactions that complete on or after 1 July 2026. The previous thresholds (EUR 60 million and EUR 10 million, respectively) remain applicable to transactions that completed prior to 1 July 2026.

Irish media merger regime

The Irish media merger regime applies where two or more undertakings carry on a media business in the State, or one or more of the undertakings involved carry on a media business in the State and one or more undertakings carry on a media business elsewhere.

The definition of “carrying on a media business in the State” requires undertakings involved to have either a physical presence in the State and make sales to customers located in the State, or to have made sales in the State of at least EUR 2 million in the most recent financial year.

The term “media business” is broad and includes newspaper publishing, radio and TV broadcasting and production of news and current affairs programming, including online news sources and broadcasting.

Note however that the scope of transactions caught by the Irish media merger regime and certain aspects of the procedure under the media merger regime are due to change on implementation into Irish law of Article 22 of the European Media Freedom Act (Regulation 2024/1083), which is expected to occur in Q3 of 2026.

The CCPC has not issued detailed guidance on its approach to the calculation of turnover but tends to follow the principles set out in the CJN.

One exception is the CCPC’s approach to geographic allocation of turnover. A guidance note by the CCPC provides that “turnover in the State” means sales made or services supplied to customers within the State. The CCPC follows this approach even in cases involving financial institutions where the CJN would suggest that turnover should instead be allocated on a “branch basis”.

The CCPC has also clarified that, for the purposes of calculating turnover and assessing whether business is carried on in any part of the island of Ireland, the term “undertakings involved” means the entire group of undertakings to which an undertaking belongs, but excludes the vendor of the business being sold. Accordingly, the concept of “undertakings involved” is similar to the concept of “undertakings concerned” for EUMR purposes.

Not applicable — there are no asset-based thresholds. Notification thresholds are based on turnover.

No official exchange rate is stipulated for the purposes of the jurisdictional thresholds. However, the European Central Bank is the generally accepted source to determine the exchange rate.

Not applicable — there is no market share or share of supply thresholds. Notification thresholds are based on turnover.

Where the undertakings involved in a merger or acquisition meet the jurisdictional thresholds as set out above, the transaction must be notified to the CCPC. This extends to purely foreign-to-foreign mergers.

No. There is no local effects test under the Competition Act, in that a merger that will not materially affect competition in the State must nevertheless be notified to the CCPC if the jurisdictional thresholds are met.

Yes. Section 18(12A) of the Competition Act states that the CCPC may request or accept notification of an “above threshold” merger that meets the jurisdictional thresholds which was purported to have been put into effect without having been notified to the CCPC.

Where a transaction is mandatorily notifiable to the CCPC, failure to notify and breach of the standstill obligation is an offence and fines of up to of EUR 250,000 (plus daily default fines, potentially) may be imposed on undertakings and individuals in control of such undertakings.

Yes. Since September 2023, the CCPC has a call-in power to review “below-threshold” transactions that do not meet the mandatory merger thresholds and which “may, in the opinion of the CCPC, have an effect on competition in markets for goods or services in the State”. The CCPC may exercise the call-in power pre- or post-closing within 60 working days of one of several specified events (see Question 3.10, below). If exercised, the CCPC shall specify a period within which the notification is to be made.

In practice, the CCPC will contact parties to a merger falling below the turnover thresholds, where that merger raises potential competition concerns, and request information with a view to deciding whether the merger ought to be reviewed by the CCPC. Where a below-threshold merger raising competition concerns has been implemented prior to a CCPC investigation, the CCPC has power to ultimately unwind the merger.

The CCPC has exercised its call-in power once as of July 2026.  In March 2026, the CCPC required Uniphar plc to notify its acquisition of TouchStore Limited, a transaction falling below the mandatory turnover thresholds, for a full merger control review to assess the transaction’s potential effect on competition in the State. 

Following the increase of the mandatory Irish turnover thresholds as of 1 July 2026 (as set out above), it is possible that the CCPC may exercise its call-in power in a greater number of cases from here on.

The CCPC may exercise the call-in power pre-or post-closing within 60 working days after the earliest of: (i) the date a public bid is announced or made but not yet accepted; (ii) the date the CCPC becomes aware of signing of the transaction; or (iii) the date of closing of a transaction. If exercised, the CCPC shall specify a period within which the notification is to be made.

The Competition Act provides for the possibility of voluntary notification of a transaction that does not meet the jurisdictional thresholds.

Prior to the CCPC acquiring the above-described call-in power, the CCPC had an informal practice of encouraging parties to voluntarily notify transactions that gave rise to potential competition concerns to avoid the opening of a competition investigation under sections 4 and 5 of the Competition Act which are the equivalent of Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (see, for example, M/20/012 Eason/Argosy).

Now that the CCPC has a call-in power, the option of voluntary notification is most often considered in circumstances where there is a high risk of exercise of that call-in power and therefore a potential timing benefit of starting the statutory timelines by submitting to a CCPC review process voluntarily.

Notification is mandatory if the jurisdictional thresholds are met. The obligation to notify cannot be waived.

Yes. Filing is suspensory. Gun-jumping is an offence and fines of up to of EUR 250,000 (plus daily default fines, potentially) may be imposed on undertakings and individuals in control of such undertakings.

No. The Competition Act does not provide the CCPC with a statutory power to waive or derogate from the standstill obligation, or to permit a formal jurisdiction carve-out.

Each of the “undertakings involved” is responsible for submitting the notification and must sign the notification as a “notifying party”. The term “undertaking involved” is not defined in Irish law, in general or in the context of joint ventures, but we expect it would be interpreted by the CCPC in line with the CJN approach to identifying “undertakings concerned”, such that all the controlling shareholders (existing and entering) and the joint venture would be required to sign the CCPC Merger Notification Form). The target, but not the seller group, is considered an “undertaking involved”.

Yes. A filing fee of EUR 8,000 is required for each merger notified to the CCPC. Proof of payment is to be submitted as part of the notification.

The Competition Act aligns the Irish merger control rules with the EUMR by enabling the notifying parties to make a notification when there is a good faith intention to merge or an announcement of an intention to make a public bid. Such notification must be made prior to putting the merger or acquisition into effect.

No. The Competition Act aligns the Irish merger control rules with the EUMR by enabling the notifying parties to make a notification when there is a good faith intention to merge or an announcement of an intention to make a public bid. Such notification must be made prior to the merger or acquisition going into effect.

The parties may, of course, stipulate their own deadline with respect to notification in the transaction documents.

Yes, the CCPC merger notification form can be accessed at www.assets.ccpc.ie/data/docs/default-source/enforcement-and-regulation/mergers/merger-notification-form.

The merger notification form requires the parties to provide substantial amounts of information about their activities, the transaction, the relevant markets and the effect on competition of the merger or acquisition. The parties are also required to provide relevant internal papers analysing the transaction and contact details of potentially affected parties (customers, competitors and suppliers) with the notification form.

The main formalities are payment of the CCPC filing fee (see Question 4.5, above) and signature by the notifying party(-ies) of the Declaration page in the notification template.

Where any documents which the notifying parties are required to submit with their notification are in a language other than English or Irish, the notifying parties must make available translations to the EC.

There are no notarisation or apostille requirements.

Yes. Following its introduction in July 2020, the CCPC’s Simplified Merger Notification Procedure (SMNP) for transactions presenting no substantive issues was fully embraced by parties and the CCPC alike and has allowed the CCPC to consistently achieve quick clearance timeframes in non-problematic cases (i.e. within its non-statutory deadline of 15 working days under the SMNP — see Question 4.12 below).

Pursuant to its guidelines, the CCPC will generally apply the SMNP in the following circumstances:

• None of the undertakings involved in the merger or acquisition are active in the same product and geographic markets, or in any market which is upstream or downstream to a market in which another undertaking is active.
• Two or more of the undertakings involved in the merger or acquisition are active in the same product and geographic market, but their combined market share is less than 15%; or where one or more undertakings involved in the merger or acquisition are active in any market which is upstream or downstream to a market in which another undertaking involved is active but the market share of each of the undertakings involved in each market is less than 25%.
• An undertaking involved, which already has joint control over a company, is to acquire sole control over that company.

The CCPC does, however, have discretion to revert to the standard procedure at any point.

Yes, pre-notification discussions are possible but are not required. The CCPC encourages notifying parties to engage in pre-notification discussions before filing a notification in certain specific cases.

If sought, in advance of the first pre-notification meeting, the CCPC encourages the undertakings involved or their representatives to submit a written briefing paper, describing the proposed transaction, the market(s) involved and the potential effects of the proposed merger or acquisition in any markets for goods or services in the State, together with a list of attendees, to the CCPC.

Irish merger control regime

Under the Irish merger control regime, the statutory deadlines are as follows:

• Phase 1: 30 working days (or 15 working days if the transaction qualifies under the CCPC’s SMNP, which is not a statutory deadline but is adhered to consistently by the CCPC). The Phase 1 review period may be extended beyond the 30-working-day period where the CCPC makes a formal information request, which stops the clock and restarts it once the information request is complied with. The Phase 1 review period may also be extended by 15 working days if commitments are offered by the parties to address preliminary competition concerns identified by the CCPC.
• Phase 2: an additional 90 working days. The Phase 2 review period may also be extended beyond the 90-working-day period where the CCPC makes a formal information request (within the first 30 working days), which suspends the clock at Phase 2 and restarts it once the information request is complied with. The Phase 2 review period may also be extended by 15 working days if commitments are offered by the parties to address competition concerns identified by the CCPC.

Irish media merger regime

The Minister will commence a separate review of the media merger 10 working days after the CCPC determination is made (i.e., consecutively).

Under the Irish media merger regime, the statutory deadlines are as follows:

• Phase 1: 30 working days. If the media merger does not raise concerns, it will usually be cleared within 30 working days of the commencement of the Minister for Culture, Sport and Communication’s review. However, if the Minister is concerned that the media merger may be contrary to the public interest in protecting plurality of the media, the Coimisiún na Meán (Media Commission) will carry out a “Phase II” examination. As in CCPC processes, the Phase 1 media merger statutory review period can be restarted by the Minister issuing a formal request for information.
• Phase 2: an additional 80 working days. The Coimisiún na Meán has 80 working days to prepare a report to the Minister, which includes recommending whether the merger should be put into effect (with or without conditions). An advisory panel may be set up to assist the Coimisiún na Meán in its review. The Minister will make the decision of whether to approve (with or without conditions) or prohibit the merger, taking the Coimisiún na Meán report into account and, if applicable, the views of the advisory panel. The Minister must take this decision within 20 working days of receipt of the Coimisiún na Meán The Phase 2 statutory review period can be restarted by issuing a formal request for information (and there is no deadline for issuing same).

Note that procedural aspects of the Irish media merger regime are due to change on implementation into Irish law of Article 22 of the European Media Freedom Act (Regulation 2024/1083), which is expected to occur in Q3 of 2026.

All deadlines are in working days. Official holidays and non-working days therefore do not affect the calculation of deadlines.

One to two months for a non-problematic deal:

• The preparation of the notification typically takes one to two weeks, subject to the prompt receipt of the required information for the notification. The statutory clearance timeframe is 30 working days from the date of formal notification, but if the transaction qualifies for treatment under the CCPC’s SMNP, the CCPC generally aims to issue its clearance determination within 15 working days (15 working days is not a statutory deadline but is adhered to consistently if the transaction qualifies under the CCPC’s SMNP).
• As explained above, pre-notification discussions are possible but are not required, but if sought, an additional period of at least one to two weeks should be assumed within the overall clearance timeframe.
• Finally, in non-problematic cases, the CCPC generally only raises follow-up queries on an informal basis without stopping the clock, rather than issuing a formal requirement for further information (RFI), which stops and restarts the clock.

An announcement to make a public bid by one of the undertakings involved, or the making of a public bid that has yet to be accepted, is a trigger for making a notification to the CCPC. In the case of a public bid, the transaction may exceptionally also be notified by the purchaser alone (subject to obtaining the CCPC’s green light in pre-notification discussions). However, there are otherwise no special rules applicable to public offers for listed businesses.

Section 20(1)(a) of the Competition Act provides that, within seven days of receipt of a merger notification, the CCPC must publish a request for comments from third parties. Generally, a 10-working-day period is allowed for the submission of third-party comments during Phase 1 (which may be reduced depending on the facts of the merger), and a 15-working-day period is allowed for the submission of third-party comments during Phase 2.

In practice, the CCPC will often proactively seek submissions from competitors and customers during both Phase 1 and Phase 2 investigations.

Section 20(1)(b) of the Act provides that the CCPC may enter into discussions with the undertakings involved as well as third parties, with a view to identifying remedies.

The CCPC will consider all third-party submissions and, at its discretion, may meet with such third parties (including interested competitors and customers) during the review process.

The CCPC obtains information from a number of sources during the merger investigation:

• The primary source of information is the notification itself, which requires the parties to provide substantial amounts of information about their activities, the transaction, the relevant markets and the effect on competition of the merger or acquisition. The parties are also required to provide relevant internal papers analysing the transaction and contact details of potentially affected parties (customers, competitors and suppliers) with the notification form.
• The CCPC may also obtain information from third parties (as outlined in Question 4.16, above). This can be done in response to the invitation to comment following publication of the notice of the notification, through informal information requests including a survey (using lists of competitors and customers etc providing in a merger notification form), and/or through statutory information requests.

During the course of its review, the CCPC may ask follow-up questions on an informal basis, initially without stopping the clock.

The CCPC may also make a formal information request pursuant to its statutory power under section 20(2) of the Act. This stops the clock, with the clock restarting once the information request is complied with. Note that where the statutory information request power is exercised, the CCPC is under an obligation to either confirm compliance or request additional information within 10 working days of the submission of the response.

Notifying parties can identify commercially sensitive information that they believe should remain confidential when submitting a notification. Notifying parties are also afforded the opportunity to submit comments on the redaction of confidential information from the public version of the CCPC’s determination.

Section 20(1)(c) of the Act provides that the substantive test for the assessment of competition issues is “whether the result of the merger or acquisition would be to substantially lessen competition in markets for goods or services in the State” (the “SLC Test”). The CCPC interprets the SLC Test in terms of consumer welfare, which depends on a range of factors. In particular, the CCPC will assess whether a merger would be likely to result in a price rise or a reduction in choice for consumers.

A merger that would otherwise give rise to an SLC may nonetheless be cleared by the CCPC where the failing firm or failing division test is met (as set out in Chapter 9 of the CCPC’s Guidelines for Merger Analysis) and the relevant counterfactual is therefore not the prevailing conditions of competition.

The CCPC’s Guidelines on Merger Analysis state that it will consider efficiency arguments, but the burden of proof is on the parties to demonstrate that the claimed efficiency gains are as a direct result of the merger.

The CCPC has issued procedural guidelines outlining the review process for notified transactions. These guidelines deal in particular with Phase 2 investigations. Within 40 working days of entering into a Phase 2 investigation, the CCPC will normally either clear the transaction or issue an “Assessment” to the notifying parties. The Assessment is similar to a Statement of Objections at EU level, although the CCPC has stated that the document should not be seen as a Statement of Objections. Such an Assessment will set out the CCPC’s concerns regarding the effect of the proposed transaction on competition in the relevant markets. Following issuance of the Assessment, the notifying parties have 15 working days within which to reply to the Assessment.

Section 20(1)(b) of the Competition Act provides that the CCPC may enter into discussions with the merging parties with a view to identifying measures that would ameliorate any negative competitive effects of the merger. These discussions can have as their outcome divestment undertakings or behavioural remedies. Section 20(3) of the Act provides that the negotiation of remedies or commitments may be commenced at any stage of a Phase 1 or Phase 2 investigation.

The CCPC has previously accepted both divestment undertakings and behavioural remedies as conditions to clearance determinations, so its remedies practice is generally more flexible by international standards.

In 2025, the CCPC secured formal commitments from merging parties in five cases. The commitments included divestments of assets and customer contracts, certain restrictions regarding future acquisitions, undertakings regarding the future management and operation of businesses, and safeguards to prevent anti-competitive information sharing.

This will depend on the nature of the remedy imposed by the CCPC and the terms of the CCPC’s determination. Completion may occur once an undertaking has entered into legally binding commitments with the CCPC, unless the CCPC has imposed an “upfront buyer” commitment or similar.

The CCPC may apply to the High Court for an injunction to enforce compliance with a commitment, determination or order. The Competition Act provides for penalties of up to EUR 10,000 and/or two years’ imprisonment where there is non-compliance with a commitment, determination or order.

The CCPC issues a confidential copy of its clearance determination to each of the notifying parties on the date of clearance.

The CCPC allows the notifying parties an opportunity to indicate any information that the parties consider to be confidential and should be redacted before the public version of the CCPC’s determination is issued.

The CCPC is required to publish the public version of the determination within 60 working days of the date of clearance.

There is no statutory waiting period, and parties may complete the transaction once clearance is received.

A merger clearance determination by the CCPC covers not only the notified merger but any arrangements constituting restrictions that are directly related and necessary to the implementation of the merger, and that have been described by the merging parties to the CCPC in the notification.

In practice, the CCPC tends to follow the principles included in the EC’s Notice on Ancillary Restraints in this regard.

Merging parties may appeal a determination of the CCPC prohibiting a merger or imposing conditions on a point of fact or law to the Irish High Court. There is a possibility for merging parties or the CCPC to make a subsequent appeal of a High Court decision, but only on a point of law. The Act provides no right of appeal in respect of a determination to clear a merger and third parties are not given a right of appeal.

An appeal to the High Court must be lodged within 40 working days of the CCPC’s published determination, or, in the case of a media merger, within 40 working days of the Minister for Communications informing the relevant party of his or her determination. The High Court will issue a decision within two months, if this is practicable.

To date, the only successful appeal to the High Court from a determination of the CCPC blocking a merger was in September 2008, when Kerry Group successfully appealed the determination of the CCPC blocking its proposed acquisition of Breeo. The CCPC lodged an appeal to the Supreme Court in respect of the High Court judgment but decided in April 2016 not to proceed with the appeal.

Where a transaction is mandatorily notifiable to the CCPC, failure to notify and breach of the standstill obligation is an offence and fines of up to of EUR 250,000 (plus daily default fines, potentially) may be imposed on undertakings and individuals in control of such undertakings.

Under the Competition Act, a “person in control” of an undertaking is defined as:

• in the case of a body corporate, any officer of the body corporate who knowingly and wilfully authorises or permits the contravention;
• in the case of a partnership, each partner who knowingly and wilfully authorises or permits the contravention; or
• in the case of any other form of undertaking, any individual in control of that undertaking who knowingly and wilfully authorises or permits the contravention.

There has only been one prosecution for failure to notify to date. Following a CCPC investigation, on 8 April 2019, Armalou Holdings Limited (Armalou) pleaded guilty in the Dublin Metropolitan District Court to a breach of section 18 of the Act (i.e. failure to notify a notifiable transaction). Armalou pleaded guilty to six charges arising from its failure to notify the CCPC of its acquisition of Lillis-O’Donnell Motor Company Limited in December 2015. Subsequently, on 10 May 2019, Airfield Villas Limited (formerly known as Lillis-O’Donnell Holdings Limited), also pleaded guilty to six charges arising out of its failure to notify the CCPC of the same transaction. This was Ireland’s first criminal prosecution involving “gun-jumping”. In both cases, the District Court decided to apply the Probation Act 1907 on condition that each company make a charitable donation of EUR 2,000 and pay a contribution of EUR 2,070 towards the Director of Public Prosecution’s legal costs and the CCPC’s witness expenses.

The offence of breach of the “stand-still” obligation was only introduced under the Competition (Amendment) Act 2022 which came into force on 27 September 2023. There have been no prosecutions to date.

Yes. Gun-jumping is an offence and fines of up to of EUR 250,000 (plus daily default fines, potentially) may be imposed on undertakings and individuals in control of such undertakings.

Yes. Providing information that is false, misleading or incomplete is also an offence and fines of up to of EUR 250,000 (plus daily default fines, potentially) may be imposed on undertakings and individuals in control of such undertakings. Further, the notification will not be valid where any information provided is false or misleading.