Switzerland

Swiss white‑collar crime is regulated by statutes and case law.

The Swiss Criminal Code (SCC) is the primary piece of legislation and covers (inter alia) financial crime offences, corruption and money laundering. Additional offences arise under ancillary or industry-specific legislation, including the Anti‑Money Laundering Act, the Financial Market Supervision Act, the Unfair Competition Act and the Embargo Act.

Case law further defines key concepts, while practitioner‑developed best practices — particularly in the context of internal investigations — complement areas not addressed in detail by criminal legislation.

Switzerland is party to several key international conventions relevant to economic and financial crime, including the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, the United Nations Convention Against Corruption, the Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention on Corruption, the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime and its Protocols, the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, the Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime and on the Financing of Terrorism, and the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime.

All conventions require Switzerland to adapt its domestic legislation to implement international standards. They do not apply directly.

In parallel, Switzerland is party to numerous procedural co-operation treaties (such as instruments on mutual legal assistance and extradition), although these govern international co-operation rather than substantive offences.

Criminal proceedings in Switzerland may be directed against both natural persons and businesses (including legal entities).

However, businesses may only incur primary or secondary criminal liability in limited circumstances.

Secondary liability: businesses shall be liable when (i) any offence more serious than a misdemeanour is committed by a natural person as part of regular business matters; and (ii) organisational deficiencies prevent the authorities from identifying said natural person (Article 102(1) SCC).

Primary liability: for certain serious offences (such as corruption or money laundering), businesses may be held liable — even if an individual offender is identified — when the business has failed to take reasonable preventive measures (Article 102(2) SCC).

The maximum penalty for businesses is a fine of CHF 5 million.

Swiss criminal jurisdiction is given whenever some aspects of the criminally relevant conduct have occurred in Switzerland, or when the criminal result materialises or was intended to materialise there. As a result, even loose contact with Switzerland is sufficient to grant prosecutorial jurisdiction, since Swiss authorities are entitled to (and do in practice) prosecute offences that have largely taken place abroad.

Foreign individuals or entities are subject to prosecution in Switzerland regardless of their citizenship or place of residence.

Swiss law does not provide a statutory definition of white‑collar crime offences.

In practice, the term is used to refer to a core number of economic and financial offences that broadly correspond to categories also recognised in other jurisdictions. Principal offences include property‑related offences under Article 137 et seq. SCC, notably embezzlement (Article 138 SCC), fraud (Article 146 SCC) and disloyal management (Article 158 SCC). Other central offences include money laundering (Article 305 bis SCC) and corruption offences (encompassing bribery of Swiss and foreign public officials (Article 322 ter et seq. SCC)), as well as private‑sector bribery (Article 322 octies et seq. SCC). Bankruptcy offences under Article 163 et seq. SCC — in particular mismanagement (Article 165 SCC) — are also regarded as typical white‑collar crime offences given their close links to corporate and financial misconduct. Forgery offences (Article 251 et seq. SCC), which frequently arise in connection with financial wrongdoing, are also routinely treated as part of the white‑collar crime landscape. As noted above, such offences may also trigger corporate criminal liability under Article 102 SCC.

Penalties against natural persons range from monetary penalties to custodial sentences of up to 10 years in serious cases. Sentencing will be determined by the seriousness of the conduct and the offender’s individual circumstances.

While businesses may only be subject to fines of up to CHF 5 million, the confiscation of ill-gotten assets — and the associated reputational harm — often carry far greater practical consequences than the fine itself.

Swiss law does not contain a statutory definition of foreign white‑collar crime offences.

In practice, the term refers to offences with a foreign element that may trigger Swiss jurisdiction or otherwise become relevant in cross‑border investigations. Most relevant examples include the bribery of foreign public officials (Article 322 septies SCC) and money laundering (Article 305 bis SCC), the latter being subject to prosecution in Switzerland even where the predicate offence was committed abroad.

In multijurisdictional matters, Article 271 SCC is of particular relevance. This provision criminalises any unauthorised acts carried out in Switzerland on behalf of a foreign authority or organisation, where such acts fall within the remit of a Swiss public authority. Swiss case law confirms that the provision covers conduct that circumvents judicial or administrative assistance, notably the transmission of non‑public Swiss data or documents that may only be lawfully disclosed pursuant to a Swiss authority’s order. Such issues often arise when corporate representatives seek to obtain and transmit non‑public Swiss corporate material/evidence for use in foreign civil, regulatory or criminal proceedings without prior Swiss authorisation.

While case law has defined the core elements of Article 271 SCC, it has not yet provided comprehensive guidance on its outer limits. As a result, the scope of this offence remains an area of legal uncertainty in cross‑border matters, calling for careful Swiss advice and co-ordination in multijurisdictional investigations and evidence‑gathering.

Switzerland has a multi‑layered enforcement architecture for white‑collar crime, combining criminal, administrative and regulatory mechanisms.

Cantonal prosecutors’ offices and the Office of the Attorney General of Switzerland (OAG) form the core criminal enforcement authorities. Cantonal prosecutors handle most economic crime cases, while the OAG assumes jurisdiction over matters with federal, cross‑cantonal or international dimensions, including major corruption, organised crime and money laundering investigations.

As well as the cantonal prosecutors’ offices and the OAG, administrative authorities conduct administrative criminal investigations relating to certain financial and economic offences, including customs, tax and financial market offences. In addition, the State Secretariat for Economic Affairs (SECO) exercises administrative enforcement in the areas of export controls and economic sanctions.

Two specialist federal bodies carry out financial intelligence and market supervision functions: the Money Laundering Reporting Office Switzerland (MROS), Switzerland’s financial intelligence unit, receives, analyses and disseminates suspicious activity reports in cases potentially involving money laundering or terrorist financing; and FINMA, the Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority, oversees regulated financial institutions, conducts regulatory investigations (enforcement) and refers potential criminal violations to the OAG or cantonal prosecutors.

There is also a notable trend whereby significant parts of the fact‑finding process have shifted to the private sector, with an increasing reliance on internal investigations conducted by law firms or specialised forensic consultants (often assuming roles traditionally exercised by investigative authorities). Such internal investigations frequently run alongside regulatory or criminal proceedings, which requires close co-ordination with Swiss authorities to navigate any procedural interfaces or privilege issues (to avert the risk of inadvertently affecting official investigations).

Swiss law does not recognise plea bargaining in the common law sense.

However, under the Swiss Criminal Procedure Code (CPC) there are two mechanisms that offer somewhat negotiated outcomes.

First, accelerated proceedings (Article 358 et seq. CPC), which allow involved parties (usually the prosecutor, the defendant(s) and possible victim(s)) to agree on the charges and the proposed sentence, both of which are subject to subsequent court approval. However, accelerated proceedings may only be contemplated where the defendant admits the essential facts and accepts the civil claims in principle, and where the prosecution seeks no more than five years’ imprisonment. The defendant must also make a corresponding request.

Second, summary penalty order proceedings (Article 352 et seq. CPC), which do not provide for formal negotiations, but function as a “take it or leave it” model: the prosecution issues a penalty order, often following informal discussions, and this becomes final if uncontested. Where all parties agree, the penalty order is not reviewed by a court and remains (in general) unpublished. The sentence cannot exceed: six months of imprisonment; a monetary penalty of a maximum of 180 daily penalty units; or a fine. For companies, it often operates as an efficient mechanism to resolve matters with limited publicity.

In addition, Swiss law provides for a reparation‑based dismissal mechanism (Article 53 SCC). This permits termination of proceedings where the defendant admits the conduct and fully remedies the harm caused and the public interest in prosecution is minimal.

Unlike other jurisdictions, Switzerland does not provide for deferred prosecution agreements (DPA), or any comparable formal self‑disclosure or negotiated settlement mechanism. There are, however, recurring calls in legal scholarship and practice (the latest from the OAG itself) for the introduction of a structured DPA‑type framework for corporates, enabling negotiated resolutions based on co-operation, disgorgement and remedial compliance measures, subject to appropriate judicial oversight.

Swiss law does not provide for a crown witness regime outside the field of antitrust law. However, voluntary self‑reporting can have a mitigating effect on sentencing in white-collar matters. The impact largely depends on the timing of the disclosure and its quality: the earlier the report and the more investigative work it saves the authorities, the greater the potential reduction (in practice, this may range from approximately one-fifth to one-third of the sentence).

Swiss law does not prescribe a mandatory procedure for internal investigations of potential criminal conduct. The Swiss Supreme Court has even expressly held that the CPC does not apply to private internal investigations. However, companies are advised to align their procedures with core procedural principles to support the admissibility of their findings in legal proceedings, should this later be desired.

Once initiated, internal investigations should be based on a clear mandate defining the scope, responsibilities and reporting lines, and structured as a focused fact‑finding exercise aimed at establishing all legally relevant facts, combined with an overall legal assessment. This latter feature is mandatory if the investigation is conducted by external counsel, to preserve attorney–client privilege.

Preserving the integrity of the procedure is essential and involves ensuring the independence of the process and of the investigator. Where senior management or controlling functions may be involved, the investigation should be entrusted to external legal counsel reporting to an independent governance body, both to ensure impartiality and to maximise protection under attorney–client privilege.

A robust methodology typically includes the preservation and secure collection of documents and data, targeted forensic review and structured interviews. All measures must be proportionate, properly documented and compliant with Swiss employment and data protection law.

Employees should be informed that counsel represents the company, that their participation is voluntary insofar as potentially self‑incriminating facts are concerned, and that collected information may ultimately be shared with law enforcement authorities.

A further key consideration is the timing and manner in which potential criminal findings are escalated to law enforcement authorities. In making this determination, any possible reporting obligations, interactions with financial market and regulatory authorities, and the risk of obstructing ongoing or future proceedings must be carefully considered. Thoughtful planning at the outset (covering governance, privilege, employee rights and regulatory interfaces) is critical to ensure that an internal investigation is legally sound, effective and defensible in the Swiss context.

Switzerland currently has no dedicated whistleblower protection statute, as previous reform efforts were rejected by Parliament. As a result, in the private sector, employees who report potential white-collar crime to law enforcement enjoy no specific statutory protection and remain exposed to civil lawsuits from their employer for breaching their contractual obligation of loyalty. They are also exposed to criminal prosecution, notably for violating business, professional or banking secrecy. In the public sector, certain sector‑specific reporting channels exist, but no general whistleblower protection regime has been enacted.

Under current case law, employees are expected to follow a tiered reporting approach, meaning that they should first raise concerns internally and only report to external authorities if internal avenues prove inadequate, or if immediate external reporting is required to prevent significant harm. Swiss employment law offers only limited safeguards against retaliatory dismissal: a termination prompted by whistleblowing may be deemed abusive, but it remains legally valid and results solely in a modest financial penalty.

In certain industries where sensitive information is handled (particularly financial services), the unauthorised disclosure of confidential or client‑related information may lead to criminal prosecution, irrespective of the whistleblower’s motives. Companies are therefore advised to maintain clear internal reporting channels preserving the confidentiality of internal reports. The process should be described in internal guidelines as part of any employee package. If a report is made, it should be assessed promptly and independently to avoid unnecessary outside reporting potentially harmful to the company and to the employee.

Over the past two decades, enforcement has increasingly centralised for complex cross‑border matters, with the OAG assuming a prominent role in major corruption, money laundering and organised crime investigations.

This focus on anti-money laundering activities recently came into the spotlight, when the OAG made headlines by issuing a fine of CHF 1 million against Morgan Stanley (Switzerland) by way of a summary penalty order after investigations revealed that, in 2010, a relationship manager had engaged in qualified money laundering involving assets derived from bribery of the then Greek defence minister.

Other OAG headline cases include Trafigura Beheer BV, which was sentenced by the Federal Criminal Court to a CHF 3 million fine and ordered to disgorge USD 145 million for bribing foreign officials. Its former COO was sentenced to 32 months in prison. Both convictions are being appealed.

Gunvor SA was fined CHF 4.3 million and ordered to disgorge ill-gotten profits of USD 93.5 million by a summary penalty order, again for bribing foreign officials.

The OAG is further strengthening its capabilities in white-collar crime matters, including the creation of the International Anti-Corruption Prosecutorial Taskforce in March 2025. This is a joint initiative comprising OAG, France’s Parquet National Financier (PNF) and the UK Serious Fraud Office (SFO). The taskforce aims to support joint casework, intelligence sharing and co-ordinated strategies in international corruption and financial crime matters.

MROS is another crucial part of the anti-money laundering framework, working closely with the OAG and other prosecuting authorities to prevent money laundering and the financing of terrorist groups. Its financial intelligence reporting has significantly enhanced early detection of money laundering and the financing of terrorist groups.

FINMA enforcement has also helped shape the Swiss landscape, as supervisory investigations into market abuse, AML failings and governance deficiencies often lead to referrals to criminal authorities, with its findings frequently constituting the backbone of parallel criminal prosecutions.

Although Switzerland has strengthened its framework to combat white-collar crime over the past decades, structural weaknesses remain.

First, while most cantons and the OAG operate specialised economic crime units, these authorities are frequently under‑resourced. Scarcity of resources contributes to lengthy proceedings and, in some cases, risks of time limitation. The federal system, with parallel cantonal and federal competences, can also lead to co-ordination challenges in complex, multi‑cantonal or international matters. Moreover, the strict adherence to the procedural rights of the parties, although an essential element of Swiss criminal procedure and the rule of law, can substantially delay prosecutions. One frequent example is the sealing of documents seized during searches, which defendants typically use as a delaying tactic.

A further limitation is the absence of instruments comparable to DPAs. Switzerland has no statutory mechanism allowing prosecutors to impose structured, court‑supervised settlements on companies. According to the OAG, such a tool could enhance efficiency in corporate enforcement, facilitating remediation and compliance improvements, and enabling companies to compensate victims without undergoing full criminal prosecutions (which are rife with challenges for law enforcement authorities trying to establish corporate liability).

Switzerland is currently implementing several significant reforms in the field of white-collar enforcement.

The most important is the revised Anti‑Money Laundering Act (AMLA), adopted in September 2025 and expected to enter into force in mid-to-late 2026. The reform widens the AML regime by introducing a new category of “advisors” who become subject to due diligence duties when professionally involved in high‑risk transactions, such as certain real estate deals or the creation and administration of non‑operational legal entities. To safeguard attorney–client privilege, the revised AMLA contains explicit carve‑outs for lawyers acting in judicial, administrative or arbitral proceedings.

In parallel, the Federal Act on the Transparency of Legal Entities (LETA) was adopted, creating a federal beneficial ownership register that will become operational together with the revised AMLA. Switzerland also recently implemented important procedural reforms: the revised CPC entered into force in early 2024, introducing new rules designed to streamline the sealing and unsealing of evidence, reduce procedural delays and narrow the grounds on which sealing may be requested. Collectively, these reforms substantially strengthen Switzerland’s enforcement framework in financial crime matters.