Malta - Market Insights

Why enforcement in Malta matters

Malta continues to occupy an outsized position as a jurisdiction of enforcement relative to the size of its economy. A stable, business‑oriented legal order and administration, a burgeoning real estate scene, an established remote‑gaming industry, one of the world’s largest ship registers, a significant and growing aircraft register, and a concentrated presence of corporate structures means that assets such as cash balances, receivables, shares in subsidiaries, and movable and immovable property are frequently located in or routed through Malta. For judgment creditors, this makes Malta a practical venue in which to translate judicial decisions into recoveries. For judgment debtors with Maltese connections or Malta-based assets, it makes Malta a focal point of defensive strategy and coordinated asset protection.

As an EU jurisdiction, recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments given by courts of EU Member States are regulated and governed by the EU law framework, centred around Regulation 1215/2012 (Brussels I Recast) and a host of related regulations.

Recognition and enforcement of Austrian player judgments

In recent years, thousands of consumer “player claims” have been advanced before the Austrian courts against Malta-based and licensed online gaming operators, typically framed as restitution of net gambling losses suffered by the same players, on the premise that gaming services provided from Malta allegedly lacked the requisite local authorisation and were therefore null and void. On the basis of this nullity, the Austrian courts ordered the repayment of net gaming losses to the applicant players. Since 2020, these foreign judgments are being brought to Malta for enforcement on Maltese assets, leading to a wave of recognition and enforcement proceedings, mainly related to applications for the refusal of recognition and enforcement in terms of the ordre public exception enshrined in Article 45(1)(a) of Brussels I Recast.

In a unique case of mass-litigation enforcement of cross-border judgments, the Maltese courts are being required to apply the Brussels I Recast framework to a fact pattern that squarely engages the tension between mutual trust in judicial decisions and the protection of National “public policy” rooted in the fundamental freedoms which form the basis of the EU acquis Communautaire.

In February 2025 the First Hall of the Civil Court issued the first merits decisions on recognition, refusing the recognition and enforcement of these judgments in Malta as being “manifestly contrary to public policy” within the meaning of Article 45(1)(a) of Brussels I Recast. The court emphasised the primacy of European Union law and, in particular, the freedom to provide services under Article 56 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), as integrated into Malta’s legal order, as well as Malta’s long‑standing policy of regulating cross‑border, point‑of‑supply remote gaming through licensing by the Malta Gaming Authority. Those decisions are now under appeal, and several requests for preliminary references to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) have also been filed. The issues therefore remain sub judice and subject to EU‑level scrutiny.

A number of ancillary points, such as questions on the law applicable to director obligations in this context (Case C-77/24 Wunner) and on the European Account Preservation Order (EAPO) (Case C-198/24 Mr Green Limited) have also been raised and answered in preliminary references to the CJEU.

A further moving part is Article 56A of the Maltese Gaming Act, introduced in 2023 and often referred to as “Bill 55” which codifies, at a statutory level, Malta’s public policy in the context of these “player claims”. The Maltese Government and the Malta Gaming Authority have stated that Article 56A does not create novel grounds of refusal beyond Brussels I Recast but rather expresses Malta’s public policy within the existing framework, while on 18 June 2025 the European Commission opened an infringement procedure against Malta (INFR(2025)2100), alleging that Malta is not complying with its obligations under Brussels I Recast. Whatever one’s view of the correct characterisation, the practical consequence is that recognition proceedings arising out of player‑loss judgments now involve substantive argumentation on the interface between national public policy, EU market freedoms and mutual trust, as well as a stress test of the revision au fond prohibition principle.

In the first four judgments given by the Maltese Courts of first instance (to date), the court acknowledged that revision au fond is prohibited, however, gave weight to evidence from the Maltese Government and Gaming Authority, concerning the organisation of the Maltese gaming framework and the centrality of EU free‑movement principles to Malta’s legal order. The appeals will allow the Maltese Court of Appeal, and potentially the CJEU, to delineate the boundaries of the public policy exception in the months to come.

In the context of this mass enforcement of foreign judgments, hundreds of executive measures (in the form of executive garnishee orders) have been issued in Malta to attach funds situated in Maltese banks. This has also led to the interplay between the provisions on enforcement of foreign judgments under Brussels I Recast, and Maltese insolvency law, given that non-fulfilment of executive measures such as garnishee orders, can constitute grounds for the insolvent liquidation of debtors.

From a procedural perspective, these cases have brought to the fore detailed arguments and interpretations on the provisions of Article 44, Brussels I Recast on the suspension of enforcement pending recognition proceedings, and a host of other issues such as the formal requirement requiring the timely service of the foreign judgment and the Annex I certificate issued under Article 53, Brussels I, “in reasonable time before the first enforcement measure”. Experience over the last two years suggests several recurring errors.

In this context, late or defective service of the Annex I certificate, translations that do not accurately reflect the operative parts of the foreign judgment, and attempts to take enforcement measures before service on the debtor are common sources of challenge and may lead to the striking down of enforcement measures, added costs and procedural hurdles.

Public policy and “free speech” in defamation damages

In a 2025 decision in Mifsud Av Malcom noe v. Ugor Tatlici (719/2020/1), confirmed on appeal, the claimant Tatlici sought the recognition and enforcement of a defamation judgment given by the Circuit Court of Florida on 8 January 2020, against the defendant Ugor Tatlici. The U.S. judgment found the defendant liable for defamation and awarded damages amounting to USD 740 million. The claimant requested the exequatur of the U.S. judgment in Malta, as judgments from non-EU states are not automatically recognised and enforceable in Malta and require a declaration by the Maltese courts in terms of Article 827(1) of the Code of Organisation and Civil Procedure (COCP).

The First Court stated that in Maltese defamation cases, damages in such astronomical amounts are not compatible with the Maltese legal system. The court emphasised that while the person responsible for defamation should be condemned to pay a sum, it should not have a chilling effect on society and the media. The state has consistently avoided increasing defamation damages in order to prevent such effects. This was therefore the public policy position of Malta, and one which should be protected by the Maltese courts.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal confirmed this reasoning, stating that, in the evidence produced, the USD 740 million in damages appeared to be moral damages decided by a jury, and not real damages suffered by the plaintiffs. The court could not determine this conclusively as the copy of the U.S. judgment produced was not completed. In the absence of this evidence, the Court of Appeal could only conclude that these were moral damages, and moral damages for defamation in the amount of USD 740 million were manifestly contrary to ordre public in Malta.

UK judgments post-Brexit

Since 1 January 2021, judgments of the courts of the United Kingdom have fallen outside the scope of Brussels I Recast for the purposes of recognition and enforcement in Malta. In this context, the British Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act (Chapter 52 of the Laws of Malta) — an old statutory remnant of Malta’s past as a British colony — has re‑emerged as a practical tool in a judgment creditor’s enforcement arsenal. Where a judgment falls within the scope of Chapter 52, registration of a British judgment through an exequatur is now permitted, where the Maltese court deems it “just and convenient” that the judgment is enforced in Malta. The recognition and enforcement of these judgments may still be refused, where:

• the judgment is given by an original court without jurisdiction;
• where the “judgment debtor”, that is “the person against whom the judgment was given”, was neither within the original court’s jurisdiction nor did they submit to it, or, if they were within its jurisdiction, were not served with documents;
• the judgment was obtained by fraud;
• the judgment was subject to, or about to be subjected to, appeal; or
• if the judgment would go against public policy if enforced.

In addition to the above, the Hague Convention of 2 July 2019 on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil or Commercial Matters (the “Hague Judgments Convention”) also entered into force for the United Kingdom on 1 July 2025. Between the UK and the European Union (including Malta), it applies to judgments arising out of proceedings commenced on or after that date. While the Hague Judgments Convention does not replicate the breadth of Brussels I Recast or the Lugano regime, it materially normalises the recognition and enforcement of UK judgments.

Where none of these instruments applies, recognition and enforcement may also proceed under the general provisions on enforcement of foreign judgments in the Code of Organisation and Civil Procedure, via an exequatur application subject to the familiar safeguards on international jurisdiction, finality (res judicata) and public policy amongst others.