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United Kingdom - Market Insights

Law Over Borders Comparative Guide: Foreign Direct Investment Law Guide

20 Oct 2026
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With foreign investment rules proliferating across the globe, and all 27 EU Member States having now enacted national screening mechanisms, the UK’s National Security & Investment Act (NSIA) represents one of the most robust regimes. Although centred on the concept of “sensitive sectors”, it avoids the uncertainties associated with other broadly-defined regimes by specifying particular activities, contractual characteristics and/or sensitive features that are required to trigger a mandatory filing. This means practitioners have a clear indication of what the government considers to be sensitive from a national security standpoint and can (in most cases) identify whether a transaction is “in or out” with an arguably greater degree of legal certainty than many other FDI regimes permit.

That said, the regime’s scope of application casts a wide net in other respects. It is investor-agnostic, covering investments by UK and foreign acquirers alike, and activities considered sensitive can extend to mere export supply into the UK (without physical presence) in some cases. It also currently captures certain internal reorganisations within the scope of the mandatory filing requirement. Outside the mandatory filing thresholds, acquisitions of mere assets such as property and intellectual property (IP), or small minority investments where mere influence (and not control) is acquired, all fall within the jurisdiction of the regime and can be subject to investigation by the government should it have national security concerns.

Below we outline five key trends to emerge from the NSIA following its fourth anniversary of enforcement this year.

A large and increasing number of notifications, but a low intervention rate

The number of notifications filed under the NSIA has increased year on year since its commencement. According to official statistics released for the most recent reporting period from April 2025 to March 2026, the Investment Security Unit (ISU) received 1,324 notifications — over 15% more than the prior year (and 46% more compared to 2023/2024). That said, the vast majority (over 95%) of transactions were cleared at the equivalent of “Phase 1”. Of the other <5% of notifications that were referred for an in-depth “Phase 2” review, conditional clearances were issued in just eight cases and there was only one prohibition.

A noticeable extension to the length of initial processing time which is impacting deal timetables

That said, these increased volumes have affected processing times at the front end, particularly in the initial period taken by the ISU to confirm completeness of a notification. There is no statutory limit to that period. When the NSIA first came into force, the ISU was able to achieve remarkable efficiency with only two to three working days typically elapsing from notification to confirmation of completeness and the start of the formal review clock. Fast-forward four years, however, the volume of notifications has increased materially, and the ISU’s official statistics refer to a median of 11 working days to accept a mandatory notification. In the first half of 2026, many cases have taken significantly longer in practice to confirm completeness — up to three or four weeks in some cases. This has occurred even where notifications are straightforward and no questions are raised in that period, which indicates that the regime has experienced a natural lengthening of processing time and constraint on resourcing rather than the ISU taking a more conservative approach to its initial review. The lack of predictability in that early period can pose significant issues from a deal timetable perspective, with the completeness review potentially extending the overall clearance period by more than three weeks — a 50% increase on the statutory review period. The government has recognised this increase in the time taken to accept notifications and has stated that it is taking steps to reduce this.

Areas of focus remain stable

Defence-related transactions have continued to predominate, accounting for 58% of all notifications and 47% of referrals for an in-depth review according to the official statistics. This is followed by Military and Dual-Use (23% of notifications; 33% of referrals to in-depth review) and Critical Suppliers to Government (20% of notifications; 33% of referrals to in-depth review), underscoring the focus of reviews on government suppliers and obvious national security-related areas.

Notably, the regime remains nationality-agnostic not only in its design but also in its application. Among the transactions referred for an in-depth review, 52% involved UK acquirers, 30% were from China, and 23% were from the United States, reinforcing that scrutiny turns principally on the target’s activities within the NSIA’s sensitive sectors, rather than the acquirer’s national origin.

Enforcement action tends to be tightly targeted and purposive

As noted above, referrals of cases for an in-depth review and actual instances of enforcement action are low. As such, a “call-in” does not necessarily indicate significant substantive concerns and may simply indicate a need for more time to work through the analysis with the relevant government department(s), for example, where there are specific government contracts in play. In the year to March 2026, around 73% of in-depth reviews still resulted in an unconditional clearance.

Looking back over the final orders issued since the NSIA came into force, there are some interesting trends that should be noted:

  • The majority of final orders were in what appear to be mandatory filings, with only around 20% occurring in cases that were not subject to a mandatory filing requirement (e.g. involving IP licensing, acquisitions of assets, small minority stakes, etc.).
  • There have been less than 10 prohibitions (or effective prohibitions) over approximately four years of enforcement — all of these concerned Chinese acquirers, save for one from Russia.
  • The nationalities of acquirers for remedies cases were, however, more widespread. The US and China are equally represented, followed by the UK and the UAE. As noted above, this is consistent with the government’s clear statement that there is no particular country of focus from the investor perspective, and rather that the need for intervention is driven primarily by the nature of the target’s activities. Remedies are most common where targets are active in Military and Dual-Use, as well as Communications and Energy, indicating a focus on security of supply of UK critical inputs.

The most common remedy was government-approved governance measures, such as approval of board appointees, board composition requirements, security clearances for board members, or employing a chief security officer to oversee compliance. Other key remedies tend to include measures around information security and data protection (e.g. security requirements for facilities in proximity to military sites, IT and data storage and access protocols), maintaining UK capabilities (e.g. maintaining science and engineering functions in the UK with suitably qualified people, or ensuring security of supply for sensitive products for government) and restricting information flows (e.g. between a sensitive target and an acquirer, or between a target’s UK operations and foreign group entities).

Recent consultation indicates some flexibility and responsiveness from government

The notification process under the NSIA has often been labelled a “black box” of sorts. There are no case teams or contacts disclosed to applicants, with an official ISU helpline only existing in the form of a central email address. This restricts the ability to obtain updates on the review along the way (which can prove frustrating to those more familiar with merger control reviews) and raises the question of whether the efficiency of the process could benefit from the parties being able to readily resolve any confusions or omissions that emerge during the ISU’s review (e.g. around transaction structuring or other details) through a direct conversation.

That said, the UK Government has indicated that it is open to hearing the views of parties and practitioners in other ways. In 2025 it launched a consultation proposing the first significant amendments to the regulations since 2022. The proposals will create three new standalone sectors (Critical Minerals, Semiconductors, and Water), while narrowing others such as AI (to exclude low-risk internal use of “off the shelf” AI systems) and data infrastructure (to focus on third-party-operated data centres alongside certain Cloud Service Providers and Managed Service Providers). On the government’s estimates, the net impact of these changes would be modest, ranging from 10 fewer to 35 additional notifications per year, but the reforms signal a desire to further calibrate the maturing of the regime into one which reduces compliance burdens and focuses resources on transactions that present genuine national security risks. The government also announced in 2025 an intention to exclude purely internal corporate reorganisations and the appointment of insolvency practitioners from mandatory notification, although no further details on this have been released to date.

As the UK’s NSIA moves toward its fifth anniversary, its trajectory reflects a maturing regime that is both expansive in reach and increasingly measured in application. Notification volumes continue to climb, yet intervention remains rare with more than 95% of transactions cleared without in-depth review. These rising volumes have slowed the initial completeness review from days to weeks, thereby adding a different layer of uncertainty to deal timetables which investors must navigate. Encouragingly though, the government’s 2025 consultation indicates that it will continue to adapt the application of the regime to reflect learnings and practical experience over the past four years, to support a targeted and predictable system of scrutiny.