When the Swiss Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) was unified at the federal level in 2011, the legislator deliberately excluded an Anglo-American-style class action. The consensus was that such mechanisms would foster a “litigation industry” and lead to abusive lawsuits.
One argument against the implementation was the “principle of party disposition”, which is a central pillar of the Swiss civil procedure. Under this principle, the parties exercise sole control over the object of the dispute.
The current CPC provides an alternative instrument for collective redress — the simple joinder (einfache Streitgenossenschaft, consorité simple, Article 71, CPC) — which may be subsumed under the term “group action”.
There are no statistics available concerning this matter in Switzerland.
Swiss law does not provide for a general class action under the CPC. The primary CPC instrument for collective handling of related claims is the simple joinder (einfache Streitgenossenschaft) pursuant to Article 71 of the CPC, which may operate either through multiple claimants proceeding jointly as plaintiffs or through multiple defendants being sued jointly.
In addition, Swiss law provides sector-specific mechanisms which may produce effects beyond the immediate parties and therefore resemble “class-like” outcomes in defined contexts.
Article 105 of the Swiss Merger Act (SMA) provides compensation for damages for any company member/shareholder who has been disadvantaged during a transaction (merger, split or change of corporate form). The decision of such a claim has legal effect for all company members/shareholders who have the same legal status as the plaintiff regardless of whether they were subject to the claim or not. A prominent example is the ongoing litigation surrounding the UBS/Credit Suisse merger, where shareholders are invoking Article 105 of the SMA to seek redress for perceived disadvantages.
Furthermore, according to the Collective Investment Schemes Act (Article 86), a representative individual may represent a group of investors and claim in the name of the group. Such a judgment has a binding effect on all affected investors.
In general, according to the CPC, the provisions apply to all areas of civil law.
Article 105 of the SMA is applicable to all company members/shareholders who are affected by a merger, split or change of corporate form of their company. It therefore has a very limited scope of application.
A specific procedure equal to the U.S. “class action” does not exist in Switzerland.
See Sections 3.2–3.11, below.
Under Swiss law, public funding in the form of legal aid is available only on a limited basis. Legal aid may include the waiver of court costs and advances as well as the free appointment of legal counsel where objectively required. An application must be filed prior to or, at the latest, during the proceedings. Legal aid is granted if the applicant lacks sufficient financial means, the case has reasonable prospects of success, and — where counsel is requested — the matter requires professional legal representation. The competent court decides on full or partial legal aid and may order reimbursement if the beneficiary’s financial situation subsequently improves.
Contingency fees (pactum de quota litis) are prohibited under Swiss law. However, a limited form of success-related remuneration (pactum de palmario) is permissible, provided the lawyer is entitled to an outcome-independent base fee that covers costs and ensures a reasonable profit. Any success-based component must be proportionate, must not impair the lawyer’s independence, and may only be agreed at the beginning of the mandate or after the conclusion of the dispute.
Third-party funding of claims is permitted in Switzerland. Litigation costs are frequently covered by legal expenses insurance, typically subject to coverage limits. In addition, professional litigation funding is recognised, whereby a third-party funder finances the proceedings and assumes the litigation risk in return for a share in any positive outcome.
Under Swiss civil procedure, litigation costs consist of court costs and party costs, both of which are, in principle, borne by the losing party in accordance with the “loser pays” rule set out in Articles 104 et seq. of the Swiss Civil Procedure Code. Court costs are allocated ex officio by the court, while party costs (i.e. a contribution to legal fees and expenses) are awarded upon request of the prevailing party and calculated on the basis of cantonal tariffs; where neither party fully prevails, costs are allocated proportionally to the outcome. As Swiss law does not recognise class actions, cost allocation in multi-party proceedings follows the general rules: where several claimants act jointly or as ancillary parties, the court determines their respective shares of the costs under Article 106 of the CPC, taking into account their role, the amount of their claims and their conduct, and may order joint and several liability. A party withdrawing its claim is generally charged with the costs incurred up to that point. Recoverable costs are capped by the applicable cantonal tariffs and typically do not cover the prevailing party’s full actual expenses; costs are usually assessed and fixed by the court in the final judgment.
Depending on the complexity of the case and the workload of the particular court, it normally takes between two and six months to get to trial.
Court proceedings are filed together. To simplify the administration, the simple joinder may appoint a joint representative (Article 72, CPC). The court is not authorised to order the simple joinder to appoint a joint representative or even to appoint a joint representative itself.
Within the scope of the application of Article 105 of the SMA, company members/shareholders can file the proceedings only if they are affected by the merger, split or change of formation of the company.
Pursuant to the “principle of party disposition”, the procedures in the CPC are quasi “opt-in”.
According to Article 105 of the SMA, the individuals with the same legal status as the plaintiff have no choice to “opt in” or “opt out”, they are automatically bound by the decision ex lege.
Civil cases are decided by judges; civil juries do not exist. Civil matters are generally not assigned to specialist judges, but cantons may establish specialised courts (e.g. commercial, labour, tenant courts). A nationwide first instance patent court has jurisdiction over most civil patent matters.
Swiss law does not regulate court-selected “test” or “model” cases; such an approach is only possible by private agreement and produces only private-law and factual prejudicial effect (not legally binding on non-parties).
There is no U.S.-style discovery. Evidence is generally taken by the court; witnesses are questioned by the court, with parties permitted to ask supplementary questions, and witnesses are excluded from the remainder of the hearing prior to testimony to prevent influence.
In simple joinder, the full range of civil remedies is available, including monetary claims (Leistungsklage, Article 84, CPC) and declaratory relief (Feststellungsklage, Article 88, CPC), subject to general procedural requirements.
Under Article 105 of the SMA, the remedy is limited to compensation (money or shares).
Representative-body actions under Article 89 of the CPC and analogous regimes are limited to injunctive and declaratory relief and actions to restrain interference; interim measures are available (Article 261 et seq., CPC). Monetary compensation is not admissible in such association actions.
Punitive damages are not recoverable under Swiss law; compensation is limited to actual damage. Contractual penalties may be agreed and enforced without proof of actual damage (Article 161(1), CO).
Damages must be pleaded and proven individually by each plaintiff; there is no class-wide allocation, except that under Article 105 of the SMA the decision affects all similarly situated shareholders/members without individual participation.
There are no specific settlement rules for group proceedings. Settlements may be concluded in or out of court. Courts commonly encourage settlement during proceedings; a court-ratified settlement has the same effect as a judgment.
The CPC encourages ADR including arbitration, conciliation, and mediation. Ombudsperson schemes exist in certain sectors (e.g. banking, telecommunications, insurance, tourism). Remedies in ADR generally mirror those in litigation, including injunctive/declaratory relief; monetary claims are commonly pursued.
Swiss law does not provide a general “payout” or distribution mechanism comparable to class action settlements because genuine class actions are not part of the CPC framework.
In simple joinder, judgments do not automatically bind non-participating claimants; each joint party may proceed independently (Article 71, paragraph 3, CPC).
By contrast, Article 105 of the SMA (and, as described, Article 86 CISA representation) produces binding effects for affected persons with the relevant identical legal status.
Academic support for the introduction of class actions in Switzerland has increased over the past decade, particularly in banking and finance, consumer protection, data protection and gender equality.
Despite sustained academic advocacy and the pressure arising from the European Court of Human Rights’ ruling in Verein Klimaseniorinnen v. Switzerland (9 April 2024), the Swiss Parliament ultimately upheld a cautious approach to collective redress. During parliamentary deliberations in late 2024 and early 2025, the National Council and the Council of States were unable to agree on the introduction of a general reparatory group action for damages. A majority of parliamentarians remained concerned that even a limited class action mechanism could adversely affect the Swiss economy and overburden the civil justice system. In light of these concerns, broad reform proposals were effectively shelved.
As of 2026, the legislative focus has shifted away from establishing a general class-action regime. Instead, reform efforts centre on sector-specific enhancements, for example in the area of competition law, and on promoting alternative and out-of-court dispute resolution mechanisms, including the expansion and support of ombudsman systems.