United States

The principal federal statutes governing white-collar crime include:

• Mail and wire fraud (18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343). These are the most commonly charged white-collar offenses. They broadly prohibit schemes to defraud using the mail or interstate wire communications. Penalties are up to 20 years’ imprisonment per count, or up to 30 years if the fraud affects a financial institution. In Kousisis v. United States, 605 U.S. 114 (2025), the Supreme Court unanimously held that a defendant who induces a victim to enter into a transaction under materially false pretenses may be convicted of wire fraud even without intent to cause — or actual — economic loss, resolving a longstanding split among the federal courts of appeal and affirming the breadth of the fraudulent-inducement theory.
• Securities fraud (15 U.S.C. § 78j(b); 18 U.S.C. § 1348). Prohibits fraudulent conduct in connection with the purchase or sale of securities, including insider trading, accounting fraud, market manipulation, offering fraud. Criminal penalties include up to 25 years’ imprisonment. The SEC may also impose civil penalties, disgorgement, and industry bars.
• Commodities fraud (7 U.S.C. § 9(1); 17 C.F.R. § 180.1(a); 18 U.S.C. § 1348). Prohibits fraudulent conduct in connection with commodities, including bets/trades on certain prediction markets and digital assets, such as certain cryptocurrencies. The Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) may impose restitution, disgorgement, civil penalties, and trading bans. Criminal penalties include up to 25 years’ imprisonment.
• Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) (15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 et seq.). Prohibits bribery of foreign government officials to obtain or retain business. The FCPA also requires issuers to maintain accurate books and records and adequate internal accounting controls. Anti-bribery violations carry up to five years’ imprisonment for individuals; accounting violations carry up to 20 years.
• Foreign Extortion Prevention Act (FEPA) (18 U.S.C. § 1352). Enacted in December 2023 (and technically corrected in July 2024), FEPA criminalizes the demand side of foreign bribery, making it a federal offense for foreign officials to demand or accept bribes from persons with a US nexus. Penalties include up to 15 years’ imprisonment and fines of up to USD 250,000 or three times the value of the bribe.
• Domestic bribery (18 U.S.C. § 201). Criminalizes giving or receiving anything of value to or from a public official to influence official acts.
• Money laundering (18 U.S.C. §§ 1956, 1957). Prohibits financial transactions involving proceeds of specified unlawful activity. Section 1956 carries penalties of up to 20 years’ imprisonment; Section 1957 carries up to 10 years. Forfeiture under 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(1) is mandatory upon conviction.
• Bank fraud (18 U.S.C. § 1344). Prohibits schemes to defraud financial institutions, carrying penalties of up to 30 years’ imprisonment.
• RICO (18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–1968). Criminalizes specified violations of federal and state criminal statutes as part of a “pattern of racketeering activity.” Penalties include up to 20 years’ imprisonment (or life if the predicate offense carries a life sentence), mandatory forfeiture, and fines. Private plaintiffs may recover treble damages and attorneys’ fees under the civil RICO statute.
• Tax evasion (26 U.S.C. § 7201). Criminalizes willful attempts to evade or defeat any tax, with penalties of up to five years’ imprisonment.
• False Claims Act (FCA) (31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–3733). Imposes civil liability for knowingly submitting false claims to the federal government. The FCA includes a qui tam provision allowing private citizens to bring suit on behalf of the government. In FY 2025, FCA recoveries reached a record in excess of USD 6.8 billion.
• Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) (31 U.S.C. §§ 5311 et seq.). Requires financial institutions to maintain records and file reports to assist in detecting and preventing money laundering. The Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2020 (AMLA) significantly modernized the BSA framework, establishing beneficial ownership reporting requirements through the Corporate Transparency Act, creating new criminal offenses for concealing material facts in financial transactions, expanding subpoena authority, and enhancing whistleblower protections.
• False statements (18 U.S.C. § 1001). Criminalizes knowingly making false statements “in any matter within the jurisdiction of the executive, legislative, or judicial branch of the Government of the United States,” with penalties of up to five years’ imprisonment.
• Obstruction of justice (18 U.S.C. §§ 1503, 1512). Criminalizes interference with judicial or administrative proceedings, including witness tampering and document destruction, with penalties of up to 20 years’ imprisonment.

State laws also play a significant role. All 50 states have their own fraud, bribery, embezzlement, and larceny statutes. Certain states — notably New York — have particularly active enforcement regimes through their attorneys general and local district attorneys.

The United States is a party to several key international anti-corruption and mutual legal assistance instruments:

• OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions (signed 1997; entered into force 1999). The FCPA serves as the primary US implementing legislation.
• United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) (adopted 2003; entered into force 2005). The only legally binding universal anti-corruption instrument, covering preventive measures, criminalization, international cooperation, and asset recovery. The United States ratified UNCAC in 2006.
• Inter-American Convention Against Corruption (IACAC) (adopted 1996). Addresses both preventive and punitive measures against corruption in the Western Hemisphere.
• United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC) (adopted 2000; entered into force 2003). Addresses organized crime, money laundering, and corruption, with provisions for mutual legal assistance and extradition.
• Bilateral Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties (MLATs). The United States maintains an extensive network of bilateral MLATs facilitating cross-border evidence gathering, asset freezing, and extradition in criminal matters.

These treaties support both corporate and individual liability. The FCPA and FEPA serve as the primary domestic implementing legislation for the OECD Convention’s anti-bribery obligations. MLATs are routinely used to obtain evidence and freeze assets in cross-border white-collar investigations.

White-collar crime laws in the United States apply to both individuals and corporations (and other legal entities).

Individuals

Officers, directors, employees, and agents can face criminal prosecution and imprisonment. The DOJ has consistently emphasized that individual accountability is its “first priority” in white-collar enforcement.

Corporations

Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, a corporation may be held criminally liable for the acts of its employees or agents acting within the scope of their employment and at least in part for the benefit of the corporation. Notably, the DOJ’s Fraud Section indicted three companies in 2025 — the first corporate indictments by the Section in 15 years — signaling a willingness to reject the argument that corporate indictment constitutes a “death sentence.”

Both US and non-US persons

Many federal statutes, including the FCPA, FEPA, and wire fraud, apply to foreign nationals and foreign companies that have a sufficient nexus to the United States (e.g., use of US mails, wires, or banking systems, or listing on a US exchange).

No industry or sector is exempt from compliance with white-collar crime laws.

Domestic entities

Federal white-collar statutes apply to conduct occurring within the United States or using US instrumentalities (mails, wires, banking system).

Foreign entities

The FCPA applies to “issuers” (companies listed on US exchanges or required to file SEC reports), “domestic concerns” (US citizens, nationals, residents, and entities organized under US law), and any person who causes an act in furtherance of a corrupt payment to take place within US territory. FEPA reaches foreign officials who demand or accept bribes from persons with a US nexus, without requiring any nexus to the US banking system. Wire fraud and money laundering statutes reach foreign conduct that uses US wires or financial institutions.

Extraterritorial jurisdiction

Historically, the US asserts broad extraterritorial jurisdiction. The FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions reach both conduct abroad by issuers and domestic concerns. Money laundering statutes apply to transactions involving funds that pass through US financial institutions. Sanctions laws (administered by OFAC) apply globally to US persons and to transactions involving the US financial system. However, the Ninth Circuit held in Daramola v. Oracle America, Inc., 92 F.4th 833 (9th Cir. 2024), that the whistleblower anti-retaliation provisions of both SOX and Dodd-Frank do not apply extraterritorially, establishing important territorial limits on certain protective provisions.

The principal domestic offenses include:

• Fraud. Mail fraud, wire fraud, bank fraud, securities and commodities fraud, healthcare fraud, and tax fraud. Wire and mail fraud are the most versatile and commonly charged offenses. Following Kousisis v. United States, 605 U.S. 114 (2025), prosecutors need not prove that the victim suffered economic loss; any material misrepresentation that induces the transfer of money or property is sufficient. The Court’s “demanding materiality requirement” serves as the main limiting principle.
• Bribery and corruption. Federal bribery (18 U.S.C. §§ 201 (bribery of public officials), 666 (bribery concerning programs receiving federal funds). In Snyder v. United States, 603 U.S. 1 (2024), the Supreme Court restricted the reach of 18 U.S.C. §§ 666 by holding that “gratuities” are outside its scope absent an explicit quid pro quo.
• Insider trading. Prosecuted under the securities fraud statutes and SEC Rule 10b-5. Penalties include up to 20 years’ imprisonment.
• Money laundering. Penalties of up to 20 years’ imprisonment per count. The prosecution must prove that the financial transaction was conducted with specific intent; Section 1956 “is not a ‘money spending statute’.”
• Obstruction of justice. Up to 20 years’ imprisonment for witness tampering or document destruction.
• Antitrust violations (15 U.S.C. § 1). Price-fixing, bid-rigging, and market allocation are prosecuted as criminal offenses by the DOJ Antitrust Division.

Key defenses include: lack of intent (most statutes require proof of willfulness or specific intent); statute of limitations (generally five years for most federal offenses, six years for tax offenses, 10 years for certain fraud offenses affecting financial institutions); good-faith reliance on advice of counsel; and entrapment.

The FCPA is the primary statute addressing foreign bribery. Its anti-bribery provisions prohibit payments to foreign government officials to obtain or retain business. The FCPA also contains accounting provisions requiring issuers to maintain accurate books and records and a system of internal accounting controls.

FCPA enforcement has undergone significant recalibration. On February 10, 2025, President Trump issued an executive order pausing FCPA enforcement for 180 days — the first such pause since the statute’s enactment in 1977. On June 9, 2025, Deputy Attorney General Todd Blanche issued new FCPA enforcement guidelines (the “Blanche Memorandum”), ending the pause early and establishing four non-exhaustive factors for evaluating FCPA cases:

• whether the misconduct is associated with cartels or transnational criminal organizations (TCOs);
• whether the misconduct deprived US companies of access to international markets or caused economic injury to American companies;
• whether the misconduct threatens US national security through bribery involving key infrastructure or assets; and
• the seriousness of the misconduct, including whether it involved substantial bribe payments, sophisticated concealment, or obstruction.

Under the updated guidelines, all new FCPA investigations require authorization from the Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division or a more senior official. The DOJ closed approximately half of its open Biden-era FCPA investigations during the review period. The FCPA Unit’s staffing has been reduced, though it remains operational.

FEPA complements the FCPA by criminalizing the demand side of foreign bribery. Unlike the FCPA, FEPA does not require any nexus to the US banking system and criminalizes the solicitation or demand for a bribe in addition to receipt.

Additionally, money laundering statutes, sanctions laws (International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) regulations), and export control laws (Export Administration Regulations (EAR), International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR)) address other categories of foreign-related white-collar conduct.

Federal agencies with primary responsibility for white-collar crime include:

• Department of Justice (DOJ). All federal criminal prosecutions are conducted through the DOJ, including its Criminal Division (Fraud Section, FCPA Unit, Money Laundering and Asset Recovery Section), the National Security Division, and the 93 US Attorney’s Offices. In April 2026, the DOJ established the National Fraud Enforcement Division (NFED), a new standalone litigating division that centralizes supervision of fraud enforcement components — including the Health Care Fraud Unit, the Market, Government and Consumer Fraud Unit, and the Tax Section — under a single assistant attorney general with nationwide authority.
• Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). The lead federal investigative agency for most white-collar crimes. In 2025, the FBI was directed to reallocate significant resources toward immigration enforcement, with agents instructed to devote approximately one-third of their time to immigration matters, which has had the practical consequence of deprioritizing white-collar cases.
• Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Enforces federal securities laws through civil enforcement actions and administrative proceedings. The SEC can impose civil penalties, disgorgement, and injunctive/cease and desist relief, as well as industry bars, including bars from serving as an officer or director of an SEC reporting company.
• Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC). Enforces federal commodities laws through civil enforcement actions and administrative proceedings. The CFTC can impose civil penalties, disgorgement, and injunctive/cease and desist relief, as well as trading bans.
• Internal Revenue Service (IRS) Criminal Investigation. Investigates tax fraud and money laundering.
• Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN). Administers the BSA and collects suspicious activity reports.
• Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC). Administers and enforces economic sanctions programs.

At the state level, state attorneys general and local district attorneys (particularly in New York) actively investigate and prosecute white-collar offenses. State financial regulators (e.g., the New York Department of Financial Services) also play an enforcement role.

These agencies possess broad investigative powers, including the authority to issue grand jury subpoenas, execute search warrants, conduct wiretaps (with judicial authorization), issue civil investigative demands, and compel testimony.

Voluntary Self-Disclosure (VSD)

On March 10, 2026, the DOJ issued its first-ever department-wide Corporate Enforcement and Voluntary Self-Disclosure Policy (CEP), superseding all prior component-specific policies (with the exception of the Antitrust Division’s separate leniency program). The CEP establishes three resolution pathways:

• Declination. The DOJ will decline prosecution where a company: (a) voluntarily self-discloses misconduct before the government is aware of it; (b) fully cooperates with the investigation; (c) remediates in a timely and appropriate manner; and (d) has no aggravating circumstances. The company must pay all disgorgement, forfeiture, and restitution but will not be subject to a criminal fine.
• “Near miss” NPA. Where a company self-reported in good faith but does not fully qualify for a declination (e.g., because the DOJ was already aware of the misconduct, or aggravating circumstances are present but not egregious), the DOJ will offer a non-prosecution agreement with a term of less than three years, no compliance monitor, and a fine reduction of 50–75% off the low end of the US Sentencing Guidelines range.
• Other resolutions. Where neither path applies, prosecutors retain full discretion over the form of resolution, including guilty pleas and deferred prosecution agreements.

The CEP includes a 120-day whistleblower safe harbor: if a whistleblower makes both an internal report and a submission to the DOJ, the company may still qualify for a declination if it self-reports within 120 days of receiving the internal report.

Plea bargaining

Plea agreements are common in federal white-collar cases. Acceptance of responsibility typically earns a two- to three-level reduction under US Sentencing Guidelines § 3E1.1. Substantial assistance to prosecutors can result in a further departure below the Guidelines range under § 5K1.1.

Individual cooperation

The DOJ also maintains a Pilot Program on Voluntary Self-Disclosures for Individuals, encouraging individuals to come forward with information about corporate misconduct in exchange for potential leniency.

Best practices for internal investigations in the United States include:

• Retain outside counsel. Engage experienced outside counsel to lead or direct the investigation. This helps preserve attorney-client privilege and work product protections and ensures independence.
• Implement a document preservation hold. Issue a litigation hold immediately upon learning of potential misconduct to prevent spoliation of evidence.
• Preserve attorney-client privilege. Under Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981), communications between corporate counsel and employees at all levels of the organization are protected by the attorney-client privilege when made for the purpose of obtaining legal advice for the corporation. The privilege protects communications, not the underlying facts. The D.C. Circuit confirmed in In re Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 756 F.3d 754 (D.C. Cir. 2014), that so long as obtaining or providing legal advice was “one of the significant purposes” of the investigation, the privilege applies, even if the investigation was also conducted pursuant to regulatory compliance requirements.
• Issue Upjohn warnings. When interviewing employees, counsel must advise each witness that: (a) counsel represents the company, not the individual; (b) the communication is privileged, but the privilege belongs to the company; (c) the company may choose to waive the privilege and disclose the contents of the interview to third parties, including the government; and (d) the employee should not discuss the interview with others.
• Protect work product. Attorney notes and memoranda of witness interviews receive heightened protection as opinion work product, which is “generally afforded near absolute protection from discovery.” Materials prepared by non-attorney investigators acting at the direction of counsel are also protected.
• Consider voluntary self-disclosure. Under the DOJ’s March 2026 department-wide CEP, companies that voluntarily self-disclose, cooperate, and remediate can receive a declination of prosecution. The decision whether to self-report should be made in consultation with counsel after assessing the facts, the likelihood of independent discovery, and other potential benefits and risks. Importantly, DOJ policy expressly provides that waiving the attorney-client privilege is not a prerequisite for a corporation to be viewed as cooperative.
• Cooperate with the government. The DOJ’s March 2026 department-wide CEP specifies that cooperation includes: timely and accurately disclosing all facts; proactively disclosing all facts, even when not asked to do so; disclosing information that may be overseas or in possession of third-parties; ensuring an internal investigation does not conflict with a government investigation; and ensuring individuals are available for interviews.
• Remediate promptly. Take corrective action, including disciplining responsible individuals, enhancing compliance controls, and addressing root causes.

The United States has a robust and expanding framework of whistleblower protection laws:

• False Claims Act (FCA) (31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–3733). Allows private citizens (relators) to file qui tam lawsuits on behalf of the government against entities that have defrauded federal programs. Relators may receive 15–30% of any recovery. In FY 2025, FCA recoveries reached a record USD 6.9 billion, with relators filing 1,297 new qui tam lawsuits — the most ever in a single year.
• Dodd-Frank Act/SEC Whistleblower Program (15 U.S.C. § 78u-6). Provides financial awards of 10–30% of sanctions exceeding USD 1 million to individuals who provide original information leading to successful SEC enforcement actions. Between FY 2011 and FY 2024, the SEC awarded over USD 2.2 billion to 444 individual whistleblowers. In FY 2025, the SEC received approximately 27,000 tips (an 8% increase compared to FY 2024) and awarded more than USD 60 million to 48 whistleblowers. SEC Exchange Act Rule 21F-17 prohibits impeding whistleblowers, such as by requiring employees to enter into employment or separation agreements that prohibit their reporting to the SEC. The program also provides robust anti-retaliation protections, including double back pay and reinstatement. However, following Digital Realty Trust, Inc. v. Somers, 138 S. Ct. 767 (2018), Dodd-Frank’s anti-retaliation protections require reporting to the SEC; employees who report only internally are protected under SOX but not Dodd-Frank.
• Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) (18 U.S.C. § 1514A). Protects employees of publicly traded companies who report securities fraud, mail fraud, wire fraud, bank fraud, or violations of SEC rules from retaliation. Remedies include reinstatement, back pay, and special damages. SOX requires filing a complaint with Occupational Safety and Health Administration within 180 days.
• DOJ Corporate Whistleblower Awards Pilot Program. Launched in August 2024 and significantly expanded in May 2025, this three-year program offers financial awards of up to 30% of the first USD 100 million in net forfeiture proceeds (and up to 5% of the next USD 100–500 million) to individuals who provide original, truthful information leading to criminal forfeitures exceeding USD 1 million. Eligible subject areas now include: financial institution violations; foreign and domestic corruption; healthcare fraud; procurement and federal program fraud; trade, tariff, and customs fraud; immigration law violations; sanctions offenses; and conduct facilitating cartels and TCOs. Unlike the SEC program, DOJ awards are fully discretionary.

These protections apply across both the public and private sectors. Companies should maintain robust internal reporting channels and respond promptly to complaints. Retaliation against whistleblowers can result in significant civil liability and adverse inferences in enforcement proceedings.

White-collar crime enforcement in the United States has fluctuated significantly:

• Historical peaks. Federal white-collar prosecutions peaked at approximately 10,909 in FY 1995 and reached a second peak of approximately 10,162 in FY 2011.
• Sustained decline. Prosecutions have declined steadily since the early 2010s. In FY 2024, US Attorney’s Offices filed approximately 4,332 white-collar prosecutions. FY 2025 is projected to fall further to approximately 3,862 prosecutions — the lowest level since records began in 1986, representing a 65% decline from the 1995 peak. The SEC has seen a similar decline in enforcement actions — it brought 431 standalone actions in fiscal year 2024, but only 303 in fiscal year 2025.
• Referral prosecution rate. The DOJ’s referral prosecution rate for white-collar cases has fallen to approximately 24% in the first half of FY 2025, meaning three out of every four criminal referrals for fraud and financial crime are not being pursued. This is far below the overall prosecution rate for all federal cases (approximately 65%).
• FBI resource reallocation. In 2025, the FBI was directed to have agents devote approximately one-third of their time to immigration enforcement, with white-collar cases deprioritized. Anti-money laundering fines in the US fell approximately 54% from 2024 to 2025, and IRS Criminal Investigation cases targeting abusive tax schemes reportedly declined 63%.
• Civil enforcement. The FCA remains a powerful tool. FY 2025 saw a record USD 6.9 billion in FCA settlements and judgments, with a record 1,698 new matters initiated.
• Landmark decisions. The Supreme Court’s May 2025 decision in Kousisis v. United States, 605 U.S. 114 (2025), affirmed the fraudulent-inducement theory of wire fraud, holding that prosecutors need not prove economic loss. This decision resolved a 6-to-5 circuit split and potentially broadens the scope of future fraud prosecutions, particularly in government contracting and false certification cases.
• State-level activity. State authorities, particularly in New York, have expanded their enforcement agendas to fill perceived gaps left by shifts in federal priorities. For instance, the NYAG brought an insider trading action against the former CEO of a biopharmaceutical company while the SEC and DOJ declined to bring a similar action.

Several structural and practical challenges hamper white-collar enforcement:

• Resource constraints. The FBI and DOJ have faced persistent resource limitations for white-collar investigations. The 2025 reallocation of FBI resources toward immigration enforcement has exacerbated this challenge, with reports that approximately 2,000 DOJ agents were reassigned to support immigration enforcement. The SEC also lost about 15% of its employees since the beginning of 2025.
• Declining prosecution rates. The prosecution rate for white-collar referrals has fallen to approximately 24%, far below the overall federal prosecution rate. The FBI’s Internet Crime Complaint Center recorded USD 16.6 billion in reported losses in 2024 alone — a 33% year-over-year increase — creating a stark enforcement gap.
• Complexity and duration. White-collar investigations often span multiple years, involve voluminous records, and require specialized expertise. The DOJ’s May 2025 Galeotti Memorandum acknowledged this problem, directing prosecutors to “take all reasonable steps to minimize the length and collateral impact of their investigations.”
• Corporate v. individual accountability. Despite DOJ rhetoric emphasizing individual accountability, critics argue that corporate resolutions (NPAs, DPAs) too often allow companies to resolve matters without individual executives facing prosecution. The Fraud Section’s 2025 indictment of three companies — the first in 15 years — may signal a shift.
• Fragmented enforcement. Until the March 2026 Department-wide CEP, companies faced a patchwork of voluntary self-disclosure policies across different DOJ components and US Attorney’s Offices, creating unpredictability. The new unified policy addresses this concern, though the interaction between the new NFED and existing DOJ components remains unclear.
• Mens rea Many white-collar statutes require proof of specific intent or willfulness, which can be difficult to establish in complex financial transactions.
• Statute of limitations. The general five-year criminal statute of limitations can be a barrier where cases involving long-running schemes are not discovered promptly.

Key developments and anticipated reforms over the next 12–18 months include:

• National Fraud Enforcement Division (NFED). Formally established on April 7, 2026, the NFED centralizes DOJ’s fraud enforcement components under a single assistant attorney general. The NFED has already absorbed the Health Care Fraud Unit, the Market, Government and Consumer Fraud Unit, and the Tax Section from the Criminal Division, and has announced regional strike forces. Its full scope and interaction with the Civil Division’s FCA enforcement pipeline remain to be defined.
• Sentencing Guidelines reform. The US Sentencing Commission voted unanimously on April 16, 2026 to adopt proposed amendments to the economic crimes guideline (§ 2B1.1). Unless Congress rejects them, the amendments will take effect November 1, 2026. Key changes include: restructuring the loss table from 16 tiers to eight broader tiers; adjusting monetary thresholds for inflation (the first such adjustment since 2015); introducing enhancements for substantial non-economic harm; narrowing the “sophisticated means” enhancement; and adding new mitigating factors for defendants who demonstrate early remediation or self-reporting.
• FCPA enforcement recalibration. Under the June 2025 Blanche Memorandum, FCPA enforcement is refocused on conduct that harms US national security and economic interests. The practical impact of this shift — including the reduction in FCPA Unit staffing — will become clearer as new cases are authorized under the revised guidelines.
• Expanded whistleblower programs. The DOJ’s Corporate Whistleblower Awards Pilot Program continues to expand in scope, and its interaction with the SEC and FCA whistleblower programs will be an area to watch. Companies face an increasing “race to DOJ” dynamic, as whistleblowers are incentivized to report misconduct through multiple channels simultaneously.
• Trade and tariff fraud. Given the current trade policy environment, enforcement of trade, tariff, and customs fraud is expected to increase significantly, with the DOJ identifying this as a top 10 enforcement priority.
• State-level enforcement. State regulators and prosecutors, particularly in New York, are expected to continue expanding their enforcement footprints in areas where federal enforcement has contracted, including cryptocurrency, public corruption, and consumer protection.
• AI and emerging technology. The DOJ has signaled that it will continue to enforce white-collar statutes against fraud involving artificial intelligence and digital assets, focusing on conduct that victimizes investors or facilitates other criminal activity. The SEC has signaled that it will continue to scrutinize whether entities and individuals are engaging in “AI washing” — inaccurately describing use of AI.
• Foreign-based issuers. The SEC created a task force to address market manipulation of foreign-based small cap issuers. The SEC has suspended trading in many of these issuers and there is likely to be additional enforcement activity.
• Private credit. Staff in both the DOJ and SEC have stated that they expect to see additional enforcement activity with respect to the private credit market. The SDNY has already charged the CEO and other officers of Tricolor Holdings, Inc. with defrauding its lenders.
• Prediction markets. Platforms through which users can bet on the likelihood of a future event occurring have become an enforcement focus for federal prosecutors and regulators. The DOJ and CFTC both initiated actions against:
  • an active member of the US military, alleging that he had, among other violations, engaged in insider trading by using classified government information to place bets on whether and when the United States would take certain military actions in Venezuela; and
  • a Google software engineer for allegedly using confidential, non-public Google data to make highly profitable trades.

These actions taken together with statements by the DOJ and regulators signal additional enforcement activity.